Bangladesh's JF-17 Fighter Bid Rattles India's Eastern Flank

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Although India overwhelmingly outmatches Bangladesh's airpower, the latter's possible acquisition of JF-17s could enable it to patrol its airspace and maintain its aerial warfare capabilities – routine tasks that may become increasingly difficult as its fighter fleet ages.

The deal would further cement Bangladesh's status as one of China's biggest arms customers. Aside from F-7 fighters, the country operates two Type 035 Ming-class submarines, two Type 053H3 and two Type 053H2 frigates, four Type 056 corvettes and substantial numbers of Chinese-origin armored fighting vehicles, artillery and air defense systems.

Bangladesh's extensive reliance on Chinese weaponry could give China significant long-term influence over its defense posture and procurement decisions. Its high-end Chinese-origin systems are likely to depend on Chinese spare parts, maintenance, training and software updates, potentially deepening that reliance over time.

Furthermore, Bangladesh's location near the Siliguri Corridor, a 60-kilometer-long, 20-kilometer-wide strip of land connecting India's northeastern states to the rest of the country, poses a significant strategic vulnerability for India.

A Chinese advance from the nearby disputed territories of Arunachal Pradesh could cut off India from its northeastern states and access to the Bay of Bengal.

Ashish Kumar Gupta notes in a February 2025 report for the Center for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) that Bangladesh's potential acquisition of Chinese fighter jets could alienate India while giving China strategic leverage to counter India's regional influence.

Gupta notes that Bangladesh's possible acquisition of JF-17 fighters could deepen relations with Pakistan, strengthen China's efforts to bring Bangladesh into its sphere of influence and compel India to secure its border with Bangladesh with greater urgency, thereby requiring the reallocation of military resources. He also adds that Bangladesh could be used to tie down scarce military resources during hostilities with India.

Hasina's 2024 ouster also reshaped the geopolitical backdrop to Bangladesh's possible JF-17 acquisition. Byron Chong, in an August 2024 article for the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, notes that her foreign policy rested on close cooperation with India while balancing ties with China.

Chong notes that under her tenure, India-Bangladesh relations entered a proclaimed“golden era,” with Bangladesh aligning with India on key issues, dismantling camps used by Indian separatists, combating radical Islamic groups and disrupting Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) network in Bangladesh.

He also notes that Hasina balanced relations with China while accommodating Indian sensitivities by scrapping the China-backed Sonadia port project and selecting India for the Teesta River project.

However, he says that Hasina's ouster resulted from increasingly authoritarian tendencies, crackdowns on opposition and civil society groups, and the resulting mass protests.

As noted by P.K. Vijayakumar in a December 2025 article in the peer-reviewed IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Hasina's ouster created strong anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiments in Muslim-majority Bangladesh, producing violence against the Hindu minority and constituting a major setback for Indian diplomacy.

Vijayakumar mentions that after Hasina's ouster, Bangladesh showed a clear trend of de-Indianization, terminated agreements signed during Hasina's administration, delayed India-led regional initiatives and reduced dependence on India.

He adds that Bangladesh strengthened ties with Pakistan and China to safeguard its strategic autonomy, while India's support for Hasina and refusal to extradite her intensified tensions.