China Turning Cold War Jets Into Budget Taiwan Strike Drones

Xu identifies approximately 380 PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) interceptors dedicated to anti-tactical ballistic missile capabilities, around 200 PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM) missiles with limited ballistic missile capabilities, at least 400 Tien Kung-3 missiles, and over 400 Tien Kung-2 missiles, with each Tien Kung-2/3 battery operating mixed loads rather than single missile types.

Interceptor costs underscore the imbalance. Kelly Grieco and Hunter Slingbaum, in a Stimson Center article this month, note that a PAC-3 interceptor costs US$3.7 million, and a Tien Kung-3 interceptor costs US$620,000 per round.

In contrast, China built over 4,500 J-6 fighters between 1958 and 1986 and 2,400 J-7 fighters between 1993 and 2013, providing a ready reserve of airframes that could be converted into decoy or attack drones at relatively low cost.

Jerome Brahy, in an article this month for Army Recognition, notes that if China launches 700-1,000 J-6 drones in a short period and adopts a two-shot interceptor doctrine for Taiwan, Taiwan will require 1,400-2,000 missiles to fully engage.

Brahy estimates that with Taiwan having 1,200 to 1,800 interceptor missiles, saturation will occur when the number of targets exceeds what Taiwan's air defenses can effectively detect, track, and intercept.

He also states that, with an 80% interception rate in Taiwan, an attack involving 1,000 J-6 drones could result in 200 successful penetrations, carrying about 50,000 kilograms of payload.

Brahy estimates such a wave could be launched at 100–250 aircraft per hour over 4–8 hours, potentially degrading Taiwan's defenses within a day, as an air defense radar cannot reliably distinguish between a J-6 drone and a modern fighter such as the J-16.

But this approach has limits. For one, while China has vast stores of obsolete aircraft ready for drone conversion, those stocks are finite.

Russia's experience in Ukraine illustrates the risks of relying on refurbished equipment for sustained attrition. As documented by the Oryx open-source intelligence site, since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has sustained 4,346 visually-confirmed tank losses from January to March 2026.

Counting the toll on Russia's newer tank models, Oryx mentions that Russia has lost 1,800+ T-72 series tanks (across B, B3, and other variants), about 1,200+ T-80 series tanks (including BV, BVM, and others), and roughly 200+ T-90 series tanks (primarily T-90A and T-90M).

Russia has increasingly turned to older tanks such as the T-54/55, T-62, and T-64, with Dylan Malyasov noting in an October 2025 Defense Blog article that before Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it had 313 T-54/55s, 1,897 T-62s, and 752 T-64s in storage.

This reflects Russia's growing reliance on outdated tanks. Malyasov notes that as of October 2025, Russia has only 137 T54/55s, 933 T-62s, and 653 T-64s remaining, with none in decent condition-all in poor or worse shape.

As Russia taps deeper into its tank reserves, better-conditioned vehicles are likely to be refurbished first, with costs and time increasing as it tries to reactivate increasingly deteriorated vehicles.

Over time, Russia's tank stocks could become too low to mount a major combined-arms maneuver warfare offensive in Ukraine – forcing a reliance on attrition warfare, strategic bombing, and small-unit infiltration tactics.