Takaichi's Hawkishness Driving East Asia Toward War

2025-12-17 09:01:13

(MENAFN- Asia Times) Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is drawing East Asia dangerously close to conflict. In just two months in office, she has stripped away decades of carefully maintained strategic ambiguity.

In doing so, she has misread the intent of Japan's primary ally while alienating the neighbor she needs most. Her early tenure is becoming a case study in how to accelerate regional crisis dynamics while isolating one's own country.

To grasp the magnitude of Takaichi's gamble, one must revisit the legal framework that structured Japan's postwar restraint, from its constitution to the UN charter. Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is often framed as a“peace clause,” Japan's postwar restraint was rooted less in idealism than in cold realism.

The constitution was drafted not to permanently prevent rearmament, but to regulate it under civilian control within a US-led security framework.

The legal myth of postwar pacifism

Article 66 states:“The prime minister and other ministers of state must be civilians,” a distinction formalized through the creation of the Japanese term bunmin, coined specifically for the constitution to denote citizens who were not professional military personnel.

Had permanent disarmament been the intent, such a distinction would have been unnecessary.

Japan's later accession to the United Nations reinforced this framework. Article 51 of the UN charter explicitly states:“Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.”

The Yoshida doctrine – dependence as a strategic asset

In reality, postwar Japan was constrained not by law but by strategy.

Shigeru Yoshida. Photo: Wikipedia

It was Shigeru Yoshida, the dominant prime minister of the early postwar era, who transformed this legal flexibility into doctrine – consciously choosing restraint, dependence on the US and strategic ambiguity as tools of statecraft rather than constitutional obligation.

He understood that fears of Japanese remilitarization in the US, Europe and Asia would limit Washington's demands for Japanese rearmament.

To him, that anxiety was not a liability but a strategic asset. It allowed Tokyo to prioritize economic recovery and domestic stability while outsourcing security to Washington.

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