Opinion Who Really Rules Israel Today?
The American envoys are in Israel primarily to dissuade Benjamin Netanyahu from resuming hostilities in Gaza or obstructing the second phase, as he did following the previous hostage deal, exploiting Hamas's delaying tactics as a pretext to reignite the war. Washington is acutely aware that members of the Israeli“war cabinet” and perhaps Netanyahu himself believe that Hamas can only be disarmed through a full-scale military campaign that would crush what remains of the Strip. Hence Trump's adoption of what might be called“Bibi-sitting diplomacy”, a revolving door of high-ranking American officials shuttling to and from Israel.
Moreover, the U.S.-led International Military Monitoring Mission, now headquartered in Kiryat Gat, has been activated for the same purpose. The entire Gaza Strip is under round-the-clock surveillance by American drones, monitoring any premature movements by either the Israeli army or Hamas that could jeopardise the ceasefire. Netanyahu and his government have reluctantly accepted this arrangement, which many voices in Israel have denounced as blatant interference in domestic affairs.
According to recent reports, Hamas now controls around 43% of Gaza's territory and a majority of its population. Washington has classified this area, west of the so-called“Yellow Line” where Israeli forces have withdrawn, as the“Red Zone”. Under rules established jointly by U.S. and Israeli officials, the Israeli army is forbidden from conducting major offensive operations there; soldiers may open fire only in self-defence, and any“exceptional offensive act” must be reported to and effectively approved by the joint U.S.–Israeli coordination mechanism.

Dr. Hatem Sadek
Conversely, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) maintain full control over 57% of the Strip, mainly the eastern sectors and narrow northern and southern zones now dubbed by the Americans the“Green Zone”. These areas are home to roughly 200,000 Gazans, including most of the clans and armed factions opposed to Hamas.
One of the major points of contention between Washington and Tel Aviv remains Hamas's slow handover of the bodies of deceased hostages. Following intelligence briefings from the Israeli Chief of Staff, U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance and his team became convinced that Hamas is deliberately stalling. Consequently, Washington has given Israel the green light to slow down the delivery of certain humanitarian supplies and to keep the Rafah crossing closed as a form of leverage.
According to both Israeli and foreign sources, two main obstacles are hindering the efforts of Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and U.S. CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper. The first is Hamas's refusal to disarm completely and its insistence on maintaining a dominant presence in Gaza, even if behind the scenes. The second is Israel's categorical rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in governance or security after the war, despite American-backed plans to train Palestinian security forces in Jordan and Egypt.
Although Hamas has formally agreed to the twenty-point plan, which includes the disarmament of Gaza, it now proposes an“innovative” alternative: it would surrender only its heavy offensive weaponry - missiles, anti-tank rockets, and drones - while retaining“self-defence arms” such as Kalashnikovs, M16 rifles, RPGs, and improvised explosives.
The movement's second condition is that full disarmament would occur only upon the establishment of a future Palestinian state, if such a state ever materialises. In practical terms, this would mean merely symbolic disarmament, with the remaining heavy weapons (most already destroyed in the war) transferred to a“friendly Arab nation”. For that reason, many Muslim countries that once pledged troops for the proposed multinational stabilisation force in Gaza are now hesitating, or backtracking, when approached by Washington. They fear their soldiers may end up fighting Hamas or being caught in Israeli air raids targeting the group's resurgence.
Another unresolved issue lies in the composition of the proposed“Palestinian technocratic government”, which is supposed to exclude both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, in line with Israeli demands. Beyond that, crucial questions remain unanswered: Who will finance and implement the reconstruction of Gaza, given that 76% of its buildings are destroyed or uninhabitable? Where will the displaced be housed in the meantime? Jared Kushner has suggested beginning reconstruction in the“Green Zone”, the areas currently controlled by the IDF, but what happens if Israel ultimately withdraws under the terms of the agreement once a multinational force and technocratic government are in place?
At present, no one possesses concrete answers to these urgent questions. The White House is expected to continue pressing Netanyahu not to resume fighting while it keeps negotiating, directly or through intermediaries, with Hamas over disarmament and other key components of phase two.
It would certainly be desirable for the United States, Hamas, and the mediators to reach a settlement on implementing the next stage. Yet if they fail to do so, renewed hostilities are all but inevitable, at which point Trump is likely to turn against Israel. That would expose it not only to the loss of U.S. military aid but also to what remains of its international legitimacy.
While the strategic and geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has transformed dramatically since the aftermath of 7 October 2023, Tel Aviv and its policymakers now recognise that they can no longer sustain an endless war in Gaza, nor confront Iran and its proxies, or military interference from Russia, China, or even Turkey, without the United States and above all without Trump.
Netanyahu's assertion to Vice-President Vance during his Tel Aviv visit - that Israel is not an American protectorate - rings hollow. For he knows full well that the real decision-maker today is not in Jerusalem but in Washington. The evidence is overwhelming: Israel is not a protectorate; it is a subordinate. And there lies a profound difference between the two.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
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