(MENAFN- Asia Times) The most notable development from this week's Party Plenum is the large-scale purge of the People's Liberation Army. Here's a brief overview of the key facts:

- The new PLA vice chairman, Zhang Weisheng, is the investigator behind the purge. He comes from the Second Artillery and is from Shaanxi, like President Xi Jinping. He is even closer to Xi than He Weidong, the purged vice chairman who met Xi during his time in Fujian.

- No new PLA members have been promoted to the Central Committee. This indicates that the PLA has been demoted. The entire PLA seems to be under suspicion.

- The fate of Zhang Youxia, the first PLA vice chairman, remains uncertain. It's difficult to oust him now because he is a Politburo member, making the process more complicated than removing Central Committee members. The Congress might be needed, but he has most likely been effectively moved aside.

The Taiwan agenda has been officially emphasized, but it's unclear whether the PLA can be totally in charge of it after this reshuffling. The strategy may be to regain control of the island through alternatives to direct military action, possibly by winning a democratic election.

The beginning

It all started in February 2023. As Covid was tapering off, the Chinese balloon incident erupted. A Chinese weather/spy balloon drifted over a sensitive military site in the US, sparking panic. Xi supposedly wasn't aware of it and ordered an investigation into the PLA. Many top officials were scrutinized and punished.

Then, between late 2024 and 2025, a second shake-up started. It's unclear if it's linked to the first.

China has replaced its last two defense ministers, Wei Fenghe in October 2023 and Li Shangfu in June 2024. Subsequently, Miao Hua, the PLA political commissar, was removed in June 2025. Now, in October, it's He Weidong and everyone else.

A summary

The PLA purge is unparalleled in its scale and duration in the 76-year history of the People's Republic of China. Scores, and possibly hundreds, are under investigation or have been. The command and control of the army might not be as efficient as it once was, although military experts say they haven't observed any changes or declines in PLA operations.

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The PLA might not be very combat-ready right now, especially with the war in Ukraine and ongoing tensions in the Middle East over Gaza. It might also not be fully prepared for an invasion of Taiwan, its main strategic goal.

Here are some questions:

- What motivated Xi to pursue this shake-up so aggressively, which didn't happen all at once but unfolded gradually over three years, targeting some of his closest allies?

- What made the army take the beating without fighting back?

The official explanation is corruption. But that's an old issue and maybe not that severe.

There have been rumors of the PLA plotting to oust Xi for years. Mao punished most of the party during his rule but didn't target the military, possibly out of fear of reprisals.

Yet now Xi dismisses so many of them, and no one bats an eye. It shows he has a lot of power, for sure, but, in Communist Party logic, he must also have strong reasons for the party and the PLA to accept the punishment.

Moreover, in a moment of heightened global tensions, why did Xi take this risk,? That's especially remarkable since the PLA, unlike its counterparts in democratic countries, is“politically heavy,” greatly conditioned by Beijing's political winds.

Historically, around the world, large-scale army“decapitations” are associated with coups, whether attempted or feared.

Additionally, there's the inherent risk in carrying out a military invasion of Taiwan. It likely wouldn't provide Xi with much personal benefit. If the island were taken, the generals would get the credit; if the invasion failed, Xi would be held accountable.

This creates a situation where generals might push for an invasion and even accuse Xi of being unpatriotic if he hesitated. On the other hand, Xi might have little or no interest in risking a real war over Taiwan.

A new strategy might have emerged for Taiwan, avoiding an invasion and instead using a hybrid approach that mixes intimidation, influence and similar tactics. Some of these methods were successfully employed in Hong Kong to ensure a smooth handover in 1997.

This plan wouldn't make the PLA the only – or even the main – player. The army would be involved, but it could be more controlled by the Taiwan Office, Tai-ban.

The downside here is minimal. If a move failed, one could try again without losing much face. Xi would then gain all the political benefits, without sharing them with dangerous generals.

Why

The PLA would have the classic motivations for risking an incredibly dangerous full-scale invasion - money and power. Or maybe something else was coming up.

In this January 2020 article, I wrote:

Days after the article, Covid broke out, and everything took a different direction.

Hypothesis

What if the PLA really tried to do something Lin Biao style? In 1971, Mao's designated successor, Lin Biao, attempted to stage a coup against Mao but was discovered and killed.

What if some PLA members planned to launch an operation The invasion might fail, and Xi could be blamed and possibly removed. This plot could eliminate Xi without risking a potential existential crisis for the party.

The elders, now sidelined from decision-making, could be brought back in, and not only would Xi be removed, but the old collective leadership system could be restored. If well planned, a military loss of Taiwan might not necessarily lead to chaos but simply result in a leadership change.

Perhaps, in this scenario, Xi found out and cleaned the deck. Or, given the paranoid Party climate, something along these lines might have been made up.

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One clear outcome is a shift in the relationship between the party and the army. The Communist Party of China, unlike other communist parties, is almost the offspring of the army, not the other way around. A century ago, the Party was defeated in its plans for an urban insurrection. Still, the army survived through guerrilla warfare and later defeated the Kuomintang nationalists.

The army has always been the Party's kingmaker. Until now, the highest position of authority was the chairman of the Military Commission. Deng was able to rally the party in 1989 simply by leading the PLA. The party leader was Zhao Ziyang, and the head of state was Yang Shangkun. Deng ousted Zhao, not the other way around.

After this Plenum, while the military remains undeniably essential, it might no longer be as dominant as it was a few years ago. Changes could be underway, with other party structures gaining prominence.

In any case, Xi now appears to be stronger than ever. Somehow, Zhao could be vindicated.

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