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The next most popular narcotics delivery vessel is the semi-submersible. There are a number of different models. Typically these are made of fiberglass, and also feature the use of wood. They have a crew of three or four persons. The semi-submersible operates with only a small part of the vessel above the surface and is designed to avoid detection. Newer semi-submersible platform route exhaust gasses through pipes in the water to cool the exhaust, reducing the IR signature of the semi-submersible. Because of their construction, sophisticated sensors are needed to locate them. Semi-submersibles are used in the Caribbean and in the Pacific to feed drug operators in the US. Reportedly some semi-submersibles have made deliveries to Europe.

Authorities estimate that hundreds of narco-submarines (the term often is used to include both semi-submersibles and low-profile vessels) have been seized or destroyed across the Americas. From 1993 to May 2023, the Colombian Navy had intercepted and seized 228 illegal semi-submersible and submersible devices.

A low profile go-fast captured by the Colombian Navy.

As far back as 2009, an estimated 70 low-profile boats were believed to be constructed in Colombia each year. US authorities estimated in 2009 that they were only able to stop about 14% of the shipments using this mode of transport. Other reports suggest that only 10% to 25% of these low-profile vessels are intercepted, meaning the majority successfully complete their missions.

The Trump strategy

As dramatic as the destruction of go-fasts and the latest strike on a semi-submersible have been, what the Trump administration has dealt with, factoring in the recent intercepts by the Coast Guard in Pacific waters, is still just the tip of the narco transport iceberg. Even with intensified air strikes on transits, attempting to heavily impact the lucrative drug trade by intercepting drug runners is unlikely to make a dent in the racket.

Trump also faces criticism from some – for example, Republican Rand Paul – who consider the intercepts illegal, as they take place on the high seas in international waters. The administration may face legal challenges, although the president has considerable latitude when it comes to national security-related decisions.

The various national players include Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador and Mexico, with large swaths of some of them, particularly in Colombia and Mexico, under the physical control of powerful drug cartels.

It is reasonable to take note that the cartels and others in the drug trade, awash in cash, can buy out law enforcement and bribe public officials. While some object, often they are murdered – as many mayors and other Mexican officials would testify if they could speak from beyond the grave.

Knocking off narco vessels, either by seizure or with more dramatic Hellfire attacks, is probably still considered by the cartels as a cost of doing business and probably does not impact the drug-running business enough to force any reduction of effort. In fact, restricting drug supplies tends to run up the street cost of drugs, increases cartel profits, and acts as advertising and promotion for this illegal trade.

The US itself is also vulnerable to cartel money and influence, especially bribery of law enforcement that's aimed at protecting the drug trade. Here are just a few recent examples:

Former Border Patrol Agent Sentenced: In June 2025, a former Border Patrol agent was sentenced to 18 years in prison for smuggling drugs, including fentanyl and heroin, into the US and accepting bribes. The case involved multiple individuals who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery and alien smuggling.

CBP Officer Imprisoned for Smuggling: In February 2025, a US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer was sentenced to prison for receiving bribes to allow drug-laden vehicles into the country. The investigation revealed that the officer accepted tens of thousands of dollars per vehicle to allow cartel shipments to pass through his lane.

Indictment of Sinaloa Cartel Leader: In September 2025, a leader of a Sinaloa Cartel faction was indicted in Chicago for drug trafficking and terrorism. This case, part of“Operation Take Back America,” showcases how cartels operate across the border and infiltrate communities through corruption.

Along with bribes and corruption, law enforcement officers and public officials have been threatened and intimidated. The lack of cyber security has exposed law enforcement by releasing names and family and friend connections that the cartels can use for intelligence collection and mob enforcement.

Cartels increasingly use advanced cyber tactics, often hiring skilled specialists or leveraging“cybercrime-as-a-service” to expand and protect their operations. These capabilities allow criminal organizations to conduct surveillance, intimidate opponents, target law enforcement, and launder illicit funds with greater speed and anonymity.

Consider the Mexican election cycle of 2023-2024:

• Time period: Campaign cycle leading up to the June 2, 2024, general election.
• Candidates killed (high estimate): At least 37 candidates (or people seeking office) murdered.
• Political figures killed (total): Up to 63 assassinations of political figures (including candidates, officials, and former officials) reported between June 2023 and June 2024.
• Historical context: The 2024 election cycle considered the deadliest in modern Mexican history for political violence.
• Target focus: Local political figures (mayors and municipal candidates) the primary targets, as organized crime seeks to control local territories and illicit economies.

Looked at objectively, the right targets are the cartels and their political backers. A key question is whether the Trump administration's focus on Venezuela is likely to impact drug operations significantly.

The view of the administration is that the Venezuelan government and the Venezuelan military are facilitating and getting rich on drug trafficking.

Most of the well-known cartels run their operations from Colombia and Mexico. The US runs up against heavy pushback from these countries, both of them with governments hostile to the United States.

President Trump has called the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, an“illegal drug dealer” and Trump has cut off foreign assistance to Colombia. The Mexican President, Claudia Sheinbaum, has vehemently spoken out against President Trump's idea to send U.S. troops into Mexico to fight drug cartels.

Whether intentional or not, the actions of both the Colombian and Mexican leaders have encouraged the cartels, which sense they are being protected against US military intervention.

Venezuela, on the other hand, with a leader who falsified his election, is an easier target since that country's support is confined mainly to Russia and China, neither of which is likely to lend a hand if the US takes military action.

By the same token, while the regime could probably be overthrown, it would be another matter to clean out the military and law enforcement, the courts and the administrative organs. It would be a major challenge that could compel Washington to not engage, or to confine itself to threats and pressure.

The bottom line is that a military solution vis a vis Venezuela is not a slam dunk, and it would increase animosity in neighboring countries who would seek to elicit domestic support in the United States.

The following are suggestions on effective measures to break the cartels.

1. Targeted disruption of production and export infrastructure

The military focus should pivot from open-ocean patrol to source-point eradication. This requires leveraging US Special Operations Forces (SOF) or other specialized counter-narcotics units (e.g., DEA/CIA-led teams) to conduct low-visibility, high-impact raids on remote clandestine labs, semi-submersible construction sites, and key transshipment hubs located in weakly governed, isolated territories.

Furthermore, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets should be utilized to provide precision targeting data for air-delivered kinetic destruction of key infrastructure (e.g., vessel components, precursor chemical stockpiles) in unpopulated zones. This strategy is designed to impose untenable logistical and construction costs on the cartels, making their production base a prohibitively high-risk operational zone.

A lot can be achieved by cutting off critical supplies to the cartels, making it difficult if not impossible for them to construct Narco delivery platforms.

A key resource is a supply of outboard engines, which are critical for go-fasts and also are used in semi-submersibles (but not always). Most outboard engines are produced in the United States and Japan. The larger engines, over 150 hp, are made by Yamaha, Mercury, Suzuki, Honda and Tohatsu.