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However, they may be of limited value against China's intensifying gray zone operations around Taiwan, as these ambiguous but visible intrusions may be undeterred by invisible stealth assets. To deter China's gray zone incursions of ships and aircraft, Taiwan relies on high-profile assets such as fighter jets and frigates to provide a visible response.

However, these high-profile assets may not be survivable in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, as their visibility makes them vulnerable to being located, tracked and targeted. While submarines could survive for longer without timely US and allied support, they could eventually be located and destroyed by China's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

Fighter jets, frigates and submarines could be looped together as a remnant of Taiwan's“US syndrome,” stuck in a past when the US and Taiwan enjoyed military superiority, with the latter's Kuomintang leadership still entertaining the fanciful idea of retaking mainland China from the ruling Communist Party.

That mentality may have led to Taiwan's investment in high-end, high-profile, high-visibility assets that, while effective against a previously militarily inferior China, would be of limited effectiveness and doubtful survivability against China's military today.

Critics say Taiwan's submarine money would have been better spent on small, numerous and cost-effective assets that could ride out China's initial strikes, are easily concealable, scalable for attrition warfare, and could bring home the costs of an invasion to Beijing.

Taiwan has been dovetailing in its military modernization, focusing on acquiring conventional assets such as fighter jets, frigates, submarines, heavy artillery and tanks, while also building a formidable asymmetric arsenal of long-range missiles, naval mines and drones.

Those asymmetric assets could anchor a“porcupine strategy”, a defensive posture designed to raise the costs of a Chinese invasion, or a“pit viper strategy”, one that allows for limited offensive strikes on mainland China.

China could counter a porcupine strategy by blockading Taiwan into submission, framing it as an“internal security operation,” starving the self-governing island of information, energy and food supplies while deterring US and allied intervention.

A possible blockade of Taiwan would mirror its“cabbage strategy” in the South China Sea by surrounding the island with concentric rings of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships, all under the strategic cover of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and China's nuclear arsenal.

But a blockade could be a low-risk, low-reward approach. Without PLA boots on the ground, high Taiwanese social cohesion, popular nationalist leadership and willingness to endure hardship – all spurred on by the hope of US and allied intervention – Taiwan is unlikely to go down without a fight.

China could also go all-in with an invasion of Taiwan, a high-risk but high-reward approach. In such a scenario, China could employ short and sharp decapitation air and missile strikes alongside pre-deployed special operations forces“kill teams” to swiftly neutralize Taiwan's key military facilities, assets and leadership.

Should the decapitation operation succeed, China could then rush invasion forces over the Taiwan Strait to quickly seize the island before Taiwan's remaining resistance and the US and allies could react.

But should the decapitation operation fail, Taiwan could implement a pit viper strategy, launching retaliatory long-range counterstrikes on staging areas, military bases, energy facilities and industrial centers to hobble China's capacity to sustain an invasion and stir public opposition to the operation. Taiwan's submarines, if armed with land-attack cruise missiles, could form the backbone of a conventional second strike capability.