Power Imbalance Beckons US, Japan To South China Sea

Then, on June 15, a new Chinese decree came into effect that authorizes the China Coast Guard to detain any foreign national who flouts marine demarcations in the South China Sea that have been set unilaterally by China. The decree led immediately to a collision between a Chinese and a Philippine ship on June 17 in which a Filipino sailor was badly injured.

This also raises the possibility that while it may be hoped that no Filipino servicemen die because of Chinese pressure on their missions, China may instead choose to seize fishermen, coastguards or others under its new decree and in effect hold them hostage, daring its opponents to act in response or else forcing them to negotiate.

It is a troubling prospect. But there is no doubt that there will continue to be ugly encounters at sea and harsh words between the governments involved, probably for decades to come.

China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been talking about the need for a“code of conduct” for maritime operations in the South China Sea ever since the mid-1990s, but no progress has been made, beyond talks about the need to talk. This reflects two underlying realities.

The first is that China considers the whole of the South China Sea, and probably the East China Sea too, as a key strategic space that it wishes to control.

In modern times this desire was first expressed by General Chiang Kai-shek in 1947 when the-then Chinese leader produced a map with an“eleven-dash line,” curling like a huge tongue through the South China Sea to depict the area China claimed to control. That map was then adopted and adapted by the Chinese Communists who defeated him in 1949.

The number of dashes on the map has changed slightly over the years – there were 10 in China's official 2023 map, up from nine for the previous 70 years – but the claim remains in place.

This is despite a 2016 case at the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague, brought by the Philippines, which ruled that the dashed line has no status under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

China has never made explicit whether this claim is one of territorial sovereignty or just strategic control, perhaps wishing to keep its options open and its opponents guessing. Its June 15 decree suggests it may now wish to firm up those definitions, at least in some parts of the South China Sea.

The other underlying reality, which has really emerged only in the past 20 years or so with the massive Chinese military build-up, is that there is a huge imbalance of power between China on one side and the Southeast Asian nations on the other.

While China now possesses the world's largest naval force, none of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines or Vietnam has been able to build up their own forces in response, either because of economic weakness or competing political priorities.

Of those ASEAN countries situated in or around the South China Sea, only the city-state of Singapore and tiny Brunei spend more than 2% of their annual GDP on defense. Singapore's 2023 defense budget of US$13.4 billion was more than double the $6.1 billion spent by the Philippines.

Indonesia, the largest ASEAN country by population (275 million) spent $8.8 billion, but that was a mere 0.62% of GDP. China's official defense budget in 2023 was $219 billion.

That huge imbalance reflects China's great-power aspirations but also its spectacular record of economic growth. There is a good chance that this imbalance could narrow over the coming decades, for economic growth in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam is now faster than that in China.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

If, for example, those countries were to succeed in growing at an average of 7% per year between now and 2050, and if China's average annual growth rate were to slow to 3%, then the combined economic heft of those four countries would reach 45% of China's annual GDP by mid-century, compared with just 15% now, or even more if exchange rates moved in Southeast Asia's favor.

Such growth would enable the Philippines and others to build much stronger military forces, discouraging China from pushing them around in the South China Sea. The trouble is that redressing that huge economic imbalance will take time, whereas the potential crises, clashes and miscalculations are happening now.

The right long-term strategy is to seek sustained economic growth, benefiting from the diversification away from China that many companies are pursuing. The right short-term strategy nevertheless must remain one of staying close to the two best non-ASEAN friends these South China Sea littoral countries have: the United States and Japan.

The role in the region of the US and Japan is only going to grow, unless and until that huge power imbalance can be reduced.

Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the
Japan Society of the UK , the
International Institute for Strategic Studies
and the
International Trade Institute . His new book,“Deterrence, Diplomacy and the Risk of Conflict Over Taiwan”, will be published by Routledge on July 15.

This is the English original of an article published earlier in Japanese and English by the Mainichi Shimbun in Japan and in English on the substack
Bill Emmott's Global View . It is republished here with kind permission.

Already have an account? Sign i Sign up here to comment on Asia Times stories OR

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.