(MENAFN- AzerNews)
By Orkhan Amashov
Iran's approach to Azerbaijan, since the latter regained its
independence in 1991, has veered radically from friendly embraces
to swaggering reprimands, being limited in flexibility and rooted
largely in history. Over the past three decades, Tehran has
superficially tried to achieve balance vis-à-vis the
Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, supporting Baku on paper, yet
duplicitously lending significant material support to Yerevan,
easing the encumbrances caused by its economic isolation and
deliberately emboldening its standing against Azerbaijan.
Iran may be protective towards external“impurities”, more than
stealthily sanctioned by its domestic authorities, but it can never
be accused of failing to stick its head above the parapet.
Operating off the grid in international affairs is not alien to it.
Iran likes to be heard. It firmly believes it has a mission.
Shaky foundations
In 1991, Tehran saw newly-independent Azerbaijan emerge as a
space in which to infiltrate its religious ideology with the hope
that historic ties, based on cultural-religious commonalities,
would prove conducive to the slow erosion of the secularism of its
neighbour. Iran also has had reservations, bordering on potential
existential fear, in view of its own sizable Azerbaijani
minority.
In an attempt to manage the unwanted consequences of increased
communication between the Azerbaijanis of the Islamic Republic and
the population of the post-Soviet nation, Tehran tried to imbue a
religious nature to the discourse, rooted in the Shia tradition,
trying to lure the citizens of the newly-independent country into
embracing a wider Iranian realm. Save for some marginal groups that
remain present in Azerbaijan, this policy has largely failed to be
of any substantial consequence.
Since the 1990s, Baku has charted a different course, much to
the dismay of the ideologues of Tehran's clerical regime, building
on a robust“Azerbaijanism” that hinges on Turkic essentials,
secularism, and later-incorporated multiculturalism. In its foreign
relations, Azerbaijan has maintained overall balance, but forged a
strong alliance with Türkiye and, much to the chagrin of Iran,
developed close military-intelligence links with Israel.
Moment of import
The Second Karabakh War of 2020 was a sea-change moment in the
geopolitical evolution of the South Caucasus, completely reversing
the fortunes of Azerbaijan and Armenia, increasing Turkish clout,
and also enabling Russia to fulfill its objective of placing its
'peacekeepers' in Karabakh, albeit on a temporary basis.
For Iran, the post-war landscape presents a new reality with
fresh challenges. Firstly, Azerbaijan regained control of the whole
swath of its southern border with Iran, re-establishing the
official demarcation line between the two states. This meant the
loss of unrestricted Iranian access to the formerly occupied
territories, thereby putting an end to the concomitant ill-gotten
gains that had previously been voraciously enjoyed by Iranian
businesses, with a likely 'go-ahead' of Tehran, making the best use
of the 'lawlessness” that emanated during the Armenian
occupation.
Secondly, the Zangazur Corridor appeared on the horizon. This
ambitious project, aiming to establish an overland passage that
will unite the country's mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave, is a
subject in relation to which Armenia and Iran are utterly united.
Yerevan's extraterritoriality concerns hinge on the thought that
such a connection going through its southernmost territory will be
tantamount to an effective loss of sovereignty. Article 9 of the
trilateral ceasefire declaration of November 2020 stipulates that
the access should be unrestricted and unobstructed to ensure the
unimpeded movement of persons, goods and cargo, with the Border
Guard Services of the Russian Federal Security Services having a
controlling element along the passage.
Iran, on the whole, is not officially against such a route, but
it is firmly against what it calls“changing borders in the
Caucasus'', defining this as its“red line”. On 19 July, Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, during a meeting with Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
in Tehran, stated that“any effort to block the border” between his
country and Armenia would be firmly opposed.
The same line was reiterated in the Iranian reaction to the
recent 12-14 September escalation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian state
border, which resulted in some military gains for Baku in the
undelimited zone of the intersection of the two states.
Further objections ensue
Then, of course, one has to dwell on a plethora of other
considerations. The Zangazur Corridor gives Azerbaijan an augmented
role in the East-West route, also benefitting other actors. Iran,
for its part, might think it is being cheated out of the prize. As
Stephen Blank, Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute, recently wrote in the National Interest,
theoretically,“the easiest route of transport should be through
Iran, however, given US sanctions and chronic underinvestment in
Iranian railways, it is hard to see it as a secure or reliable
option”.
There is also an unhealthy dose of conspiracy theory
infiltrating the Iranian rhetoric. For instance, Ahmed Kazemi, an
expert on Caucasus studies, who is not a government official, but
believed to be linked to Iranian intelligence, in an interview with
Pars Today, argued that the project, which he dubbed“the
Turanian-NATO Corridor'', is the joint British-Israeli plot to
undermine Tehran's geopolitical interests and prepare the ground
for NATO's subtle expansion into the Caspian, nearing the Chinese
realm of influence. His claim seems to have been heavily influenced
by that which Adam Thompson, former British representative to NATO,
allegedly stated regarding the implications of the Second Karabakh
War.
There is also a view, peddled in the Iranian and Armenian media,
that the war of 2020 had an ostensible aim of targeting Iran, with
a view to curbing its influence. These all seem to ascribe an
inflated import to Iran's position in the grand scheme of things,
marginalising the actual underpinning of the geopolitical triggers
that led to the eruption of hostilities between Azerbaijan and
Armenia at the time.
Iran's surreptitious design
There is also another less visible aspect to the Iranian
posturing, which points to the realm of Tehran-Yerevan military
cooperation. Although Iran acknowledged the verdict of the Second
Karabakh War and congratulated Baku on its victory between clenched
teeth, there have been some indications that, in practice, it
shares the sentiments of the warmongering party in Yerevan.
Robert Cutler, Senior Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, believes that Tehran“is trying harder than ever to
assert itself overtly in the South Caucasus through the instrument
of the Armenian military-industry complex”. The presence of Iranian
military companies on Armenian soil has increased at an
unprecedented rate, with laser-and-communications-system and drone
manufacturers being the most involved. The enduring ties, linking
the Kocharyan-Sargsyan remnants in the Armenian army and Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps are also a factor to be reckoned
with.
Tehran is also, albeit understandably, concerned about Israeli
involvement in Azerbaijan. This is not a new pattern, but has
assumed a heightened significance over the past few years. When
George Deek, Israeli Ambassador in Baku, posted his photo on
Twitter reading a book titled“Mysterious Tales of Tabriz” with the
wording“I am learning so much about the Azerbaijani city of
Tabriz…“ in July of this year, Iran felt enraged by this allegedly
polemical act.
Abbas Mousavi, Iranian Ambassador to Baku, retorted with a
warning in the jargon befitting the Islamic Republic's known
uncompromising anti-Israeli belligerence.“Apparently, the first
evil Zionist is going to be buried by the zealous people of Tabriz,
too. Never cross our red-line, ever!”, exclaimed the diplomat in
none too diplomatic terms.
The deep causes of the acrimony lie far deeper, of course. The
tight Tel-Aviv–Baku relations are based on mutual interests and
their perpetuation into a wider geopolitical space. Azerbaijan has
benefited from the purchase of cutting-edge Israeli weaponry to
augment its defence capabilities. And, as the recent article
published in“Breaking Defence” suggests,“in theory, Azerbaijani
may offer up its airspace for Israeli jets to enter Iranian
territory, if needed”. Baku, however, has been extremely careful so
far to arrange its partnership with Israel in such a way that would
not give rise to a substantial Iranian protestation.
As was stated at the outset, the Zangazur Project is the focal
point. It is a direct takeaway from the 10 November ceasefire deal
that Armenia has still not fully implemented. The project has made
its way into the practical dimension through the war, the
consequences of which continue to befuddle a bemused Iran. Hence,
any dispute between Baku and Tehran over the subject provides a
common ground for Iran and Armenia to feel united in their
grievances.
All in all, the true origin of Iranian angst is the agony of
self-knowledge, if one may borrow from former British Prime
Minister and now-late Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher's epiphanic
insight on the character of Germany. The contexts differ, indeed
violently, but there is a linchpin rendering the appropriation
legitimate. Modern Iran is tormented by the knowledge of the
futility of its values and consequent international aspirations.
Its governance system cannot be replicated in any advanced
civilised society.
Azerbaijan will continue to steadfastly obviate the possibility
of falling victim to its wrath. If enough Iranian influence is
entrenched in Armenia, the latter will risk becoming a failed state
(it currently has small hope of salvation), reminding some of the
features of Lebanon.
The contemporary unrest in Iran shows, with uncanny honesty,
that the Islamic Republic has nurtured little that is admirable and
worthy of being interpolated into one's own system of values.
Tehran may dismiss Azerbaijan and sometimes do so with impunity.
Nevertheless, the shifting sands of the wider geopolitical
landscape point to a different reality. History will judge who is
better to learn from whom.
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