Tuesday, 02 January 2024 12:17 GMT

Asia Outlook 2027: Growth Broadens, Capital Gets Selective


Date:

(MENAFN- ING) How did Asia's economy perform in 2026, and what will look different in 2027?

2026 was stronger than expected

Asia surprised on the upside in 2026, with regional GDP growth outperforming expectations, led by strong exports and investment activity. Investment remained robust across much of the region, supported by technology-related spending and government-led infrastructure projects. This enabled export-oriented economies such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore to significantly exceed consensus growth forecasts.

The picture was less favourable in economies more reliant on domestic demand. Indonesia and the Philippines disappointed expectations as household consumption remained subdued. Higher energy prices weighed on real incomes, while the Philippines also faced a drag from slower government spending amid political and corruption-related controversies. Both economies attracted relatively less tech-related foreign direct investment than the region's manufacturing and semiconductor hubs, limiting support from global dynamics.

India was a notable outperformer. Despite benefiting less directly from the AI-driven boom and facing higher energy import costs, it expanded by a robust 8.2% year-on-year in the first half of 2026. Growth continued to be supported by structural reforms, public capital expenditure and subsidies that cushioned households from higher fuel prices

AI-led divergences should narrow in 2027, favouring South Asia

Overall, we expect GDP growth excluding China to slow to 3.8% in 2027, down from 4.5% in 2026. Tight chip supply should continue to support investment growth through 2027, but as capex growth slows from today's exceptional pace, AI's contribution to growth is likely to moderate.

As AI tailwinds fade and the full effects of monetary tightening are felt, growth in developed Asia, particularly Korea and Australia, could slow more than in developing Asia. Korea is the clearest example, where growth has been concentrated in technology-related sectors while domestic demand, non-tech industries and broader wage growth have lagged. As in previous investment-led booms, the benefits have been slower to filter through to the wider economy.

By contrast, the Philippines' 2026 growth disappointment was driven primarily by policy and political uncertainty, both of which are likely to prove temporary. India continues to occupy a relative sweet spot. While it benefited less from the AI boom, it's also less exposed to any correction. Structural reforms, infrastructure spending, and resilient services exports should leave it relatively well placed as the AI cycle normalises.

The divergence is less pronounced in parts of Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore and Malaysia, where domestic demand has remained relatively resilient alongside a strong external sector.

Trade growth likely to moderate in 2027

Asian economies are expected to be the largest contributors to global trade volume growth for the third consecutive year in 2026. According to World Trade Organisation forecasts, global trade growth is expected to moderate in 2027 as AI-related demand cools from exceptionally strong levels, though the deceleration should be gradual rather than abrupt.

Recent data has been mixed. Some signs of moderation appear in semiconductor export growth in Japan and Taiwan, and export orders softened across the board in October. However, semiconductor exports from Korea and China continue to post strong gains. Data from Taiwan suggest it's still too early to call a turning point.

Even so, trade growth should remain relatively resilient in 2027, supported by ongoing supply-chain diversification, continued investment flows and still-elevated levels of AI-related activity. This is even as the pace of expansion normalises.

Pockets of domestic demand strength should support growth

The structural backdrop for consumption in Japan is becoming more supportive. Wage growth has increased significantly since the start of the year. Also, households are gradually shifting away from the cash-heavy behaviour associated with the deflation era towards greater participation in financial markets. This supports wealth creation and consumption.

Singapore should continue to see resilient consumption growth, supported by strong FDI inflows and spillovers from the AI investment cycle. These tailwinds are feeding into firm wage growth and stronger household purchasing power. Singapore has also experienced one of the largest fuel price increases in the region. If energy prices correct as expected, lower fuel costs should further boost consumer spending.

In India, consumer spending was relatively insulated from the energy price shock, aided by government subsidies and only partial pass-through of higher input costs. While consumption growth may moderate in 2027 due to weaker agricultural output from El Niño and tighter monetary policy, strong government spending should continue to support rural incomes. Lower input costs as oil prices correct should help sustain household spending.

Asia GDP growth likely to moderate in 2027 as AI tailwinds fade Source: CEIC, ING

"> How is AI reshaping Asia's growth story, and can the region continue to benefit as the boom matures?

Looking ahead to 2027, North Asia should continue to dominate AI trade. Southeast Asia should play an increasingly important role as its AI story is driven by production, investment and supply-chain integration rather than AI adoption itself. While the region doesn't have the largest AI companies, it's become indispensable to hardware and manufacturing ecosystems that make AI possible. As firms diversify supply chains and invest in AI infrastructure, Southeast Asia stands out as one of the largest structural beneficiaries of the AI boom outside North Asia.

Why we remain constructive:

Trade dominance: Asia accounted for about 77% of AI-driven exports in 2025

Asia sits at the centre of the global AI hardware ecosystem. It dominates global trade in AI-enabling goods. East Asia, excluding China, accounts for more than 40% of global exports of AI-related products. Southeast Asia contributes another quarter despite having a much smaller share of overall world trade. With China contributing another 13%, Asia is generating much of the world's growth in AI-related exports.

The same dynamic is visible on the import side. AI-enabling goods account for a far larger share of imports than East Asia's and Southeast Asia's share of overall trade, underscoring the deep integration of global AI supply chains.

Growth in the first half of 2026 reinforced Asia's leadership, with the region's largest AI exporters recording the fastest growth. In the second quarter, exports of AI-enabling goods surged by 80% YoY. East Asia's contribution to global export growth doubled to 32.3 percentage points in just six months, while Southeast Asia's share similarly surged to 22.0 percentage points. China alone accounted for a further 12.8 percentage points, underscoring the region's outsized role in driving global trade.

These trade relationships have shifted markedly over the last decade. One notable change is Southeast Asia's growing share of US imports, consistent with the rapid build-out of data centres by hyperscaler firms. Yet Southeast Asia has lagged in strengthening trade linkages with East Asia, excluding China, and within the region itself. This suggests there's scope for deeper regional integration as the AI ecosystem expands.

Broadening beneficiaries: Asia's AI story extends beyond Korea/Taiwan

On products, much of the focus has been on memory chip exports from Korea and Taiwan. But the beneficiaries of the AI boom are increasingly broadening. ASEAN economies have attracted substantial foreign direct investment in semiconductors ucand increased their share of global non-memory chip production. Singapore and Malaysia now account for more than 33% of global amplifier chip exports, up from 23% a decade ago. The Philippines and Thailand have made impressive gains, together accounting for around 2.5% of global exports.

Looking across the AI value chain, almost all AI-enabling goods trade is concentrated in intermediate inputs (62%) and equipment (37%). While East Asia, ex-China, remains the dominant supplier at every stage of the value chain, Southeast Asia has emerged as a critical second hub. It accounts for roughly a quarter of global exports of AI-related equipment, spanning the full value chain from semiconductor manufacturing to the servers and other infrastructure deployed in data centres. This is particularly significant because the fastest-growing areas of AI investment are in physical infrastructure, including data centres, servers, and semiconductor packaging and testing, where Southeast Asia has built a strong competitive advantage.

Southeast Asia's importance is especially evident in the middle of the value chain. Together, East Asia and Southeast Asia account for nearly 90% of global trade in AI-related intermediate inputs, with Southeast Asia contributing around 23%.

While growth in AI-related demand may eventually moderate, Asia's central role in hardware and manufacturing ecosystems should help sustain investment, trade and industrial activity. This should keep the region a key beneficiary of the AI cycle for years to come.

Asia dominates global AI trade, with Southeast Asia gaining ground Note: AI enabling goods refer to products that facilitate the use of AI in various sectors, and are part of a list used in 2025 World Trade Report.

Source: WTO

"> Is AI driving inflation or productivity in Asia? And is it disrupting jobs or transforming them?

AI's economic impact in Asia is likely to be uneven over time. Signs of AI-related inflation are already visible, particularly in Korea, where technology-related price increases are contributing meaningfully to headline CPI. By contrast, evidence of productivity improvements remains concentrated in parts of the technology sector and highly AI-complementary occupations. While the productivity benefits could ultimately prove more significant, they're likely to emerge gradually and take longer to be reflected in economy-wide data.

AI is starting to show up in Asia's inflation data, especially Korea

AI is likely to be inflationary in the short term. This is reflected in the sharp rise in memory chip prices and strong tech exports, as demand for chips continues to outpace supply. Recent consumer price data suggest electronics prices are beginning to recover across parts of Asia, with the strongest increases seen in mobile phones, computers and communication equipment.

The sharpest increases have been in Korea, where data storage device prices rose around 40% YoY year-to-date. Inflation is accelerating rapidly in these categories. Mobile phone prices rose 11% YoY in October, up from just 2% at the start of the year. Computer-related prices accelerated to 24% YoY from 6% earlier in the year. Mobile handset and communication device inflation has also picked up in India and Indonesia, reaching 6-8% YoY.

Contribution to headline inflation varies across Asia, but generally remains low given the lower weights of technology-related components. Korea is seeing one of the region's largest increases, with AI-related categories adding about 20bp to headline inflation. In most other Asian economies, the contribution remains below 10 basis points despite price increases, reflecting much smaller CPI weights.

Evidence of AI-related inflation in services is less clear-cut. Information and communication services inflation has picked up in Korea and Malaysia, while falling communication charges continue to weigh on technology-related CPI components in Singapore. Overall, however, the contribution to headline inflation remains modest.

Emerging productivity gains

On productivity, the distinction between AI producers and AI users matters. The IMF finds that advanced Asian economies like Singapore, Korea and Japan have a relatively high concentration of jobs where AI is more likely to augment workers than replace them, creating greater potential for productivity gains. Around 40% of jobs in Singapore are estimated to be highly complementary to AI.

The key question, however, is whether these gains are already visible in the data. Direct evidence remains limited given the short time frame of AI adoption. Australia is one of the few economies in the region where available data draw some tentative conclusions. Our analysis of changes in real output per worker suggests productivity growth has improved in parts of the technology sector, particularly telecommunications services. While it's still too early to attribute this entirely to AI, the evidence is consistent with technology adoption beginning to support productivity growth in selected industries.

Early evidence points to adaptation, not job losses

Evidence from Korea suggests AI may be reshaping labour demand unevenly. Youth employment has weakened in highly AI-exposed industries, while employment among workers in their 50s has increased. India and the Philippines are among the countries most exposed to AI because of their sizeable outsourcing sectors. Early evidence points to job transformation and augmentation rather than widespread displacement.

In the Philippines, employment in information and communications, professional services, and scientific and technical services has grown by around 4.5% over the past year. Recent readings remain close to long-term trends. Digitally delivered services exports continue to expand, even as the composition shifts. Financial services and computer services are increasingly driving growth, while the share of more traditional business process outsourcing activities becomes less dominant.

The evidence from India points in a similar direction. Rather than widespread layoffs, AI's impact appears to be showing up through slower hiring and changing skill requirements. While AI is reducing demand for some traditional roles, it's creating demand for new skills. Traditional IT firms are hiring more cautiously, but global capability centres (GCCs) continue to expand and absorb higher-skilled talent. As a result, India's business services exports have more than doubled as a share of GDP since the pandemic. Even as AI automates more routine coding and back-office tasks, demand remains strong for higher-value activities such as software development, analytics, AI integration and cybersecurity.

AI is already contributing to higher inflation in Korea Source: CEIC

"> AI is driving a shift in composition of services exports Source: WTO

"> How are Asia's trade and investment relationships shifting?

Diversification, not deglobalisation

The key lesson from 2026 is that tariffs and geopolitical tensions are reshaping trade patterns rather than materially reducing volumes. Rather than exiting Asia, firms have responded by diversifying production, sourcing, and investment across a wider range of regional economies.

Tariffs remain an important risk, particularly if the Trump administration refocuses on trade policy. Recent experience suggests higher tariffs are more likely to shift where production occurs than to reverse the broader diversification trend. While economies such as Vietnam and Thailand may face greater scrutiny after gaining significant US market share, tariff differentials with China are likely to remain large enough to keep incentives for firms to maintain diversified regional supply chains.

Diversification does not mean decoupling from China

Despite tariffs, Asia ex-China's trade surplus with the US has almost doubled since the end of 2021, driven primarily by Taiwan, Vietnam and Thailand. Over the same period, much of the rise in ASEAN's trade surplus with the US was mirrored by a corresponding decline in China's surplus, pointing to a reconfiguration rather than a reduction of regional trade flows. The pattern suggests supply chains are being reconfigured across Asia rather than shifting away from the region altogether.

More importantly, production relocation has not meaningfully reduced China's role in regional supply chains. While final assembly and exports to the US increasingly take place in economies such as Vietnam and Thailand, a significant share of intermediate inputs still originates in China. This means supply chains are becoming more geographically diversified but remain closely integrated with China.

Europe is becoming a more important trade and investment partner

Asia's trade and investment relationships are becoming more diversified, with Europe playing an increasingly important role. Trade ties have strengthened significantly in recent years, and Asia continues to gain export market share in Europe. Since 2024, ASEAN exports to the EU have risen by around 30%. ASEAN now exports more to Europe than Korea, Taiwan and Japan combined. Looking ahead, a renewed push towards free-trade agreements could provide further support. The proposed India-EU Free Trade Agreement is particularly significant, while a growing network of agreements between ASEAN economies and European partners is helping to lower barriers to trade and investment.

The investment relationship with Europe is strengthening even faster. EU foreign direct investment into ASEAN surged to $31 billion in 2021, overtaking the US as ASEAN's second-largest source of FDI. More importantly, investment decisions are increasingly shaped by strategic imperatives rather than cost competitiveness alone. European firms increasingly view ASEAN not just as a manufacturing base, but as a strategic hub for regional operations, supply-chain diversification, and long-term growth. Reflecting this shift, investment has broadened beyond manufacturing into sectors such as finance, wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage.

Europe's role in Asia is growing as trade and investment ties deepen Source: CEIC

"> Has inflation peaked in Asia, and what are the key risks to 2027?

Inflation outlook 2027: Lower headline gains but stickier core pressures

Though it's too early to call a peak in inflation in most of Asia, we do expect prices to moderate in many parts of the region in 2027, driven by easing energy and food prices. The largest declines should occur in economies such as the Philippines and Singapore, where recent inflation was driven primarily by fuel and food shocks. Economies at the centre of the AI hardware ecosystem, particularly Korea and Taiwan, may experience stickier core inflation as technology-related price pressures continue to build.

While headline inflation should move lower, the balance of risks is shifting from commodity-driven inflation towards technology-driven inflation. This implies that while goods inflation may moderate as energy and food pressures fade, core inflation could remain stickier than expected. As a result, inflation may prove more persistent than historical relationships with energy and food prices alone would suggest.

Energy and food disinflation should drive the decline in inflation

Inflation has likely not yet peaked across most Asian economies, but we expect it to do so in 4Q26-1Q27, with a clearer moderation emerging from 2Q27. The key driver is energy prices.

We expect Brent crude to average around US$77/bbl in 2027, around 14% below 2026 levels. While occasional US-Iran tensions should keep some geopolitical risk premium in the market, we expect a growing supply surplus to outweigh these concerns provided there are no major disruptions to Persian Gulf exports. A US-Iran agreement would present further downside risk to oil prices and, by extension, inflation across Asia. Refined fuel prices should moderate year on year. Diesel prices could decline more sharply as crack spreads normalise following the return of Russian supply, although margins are likely to remain above historical averages.

Inflation should ease more noticeably from the second quarter of 2027, aided by favorable energy base effects as oil prices were unusually high a year earlier. Lower oil prices should also gradually filter through to retail fuel costs, helping push headline inflation lower across much of developing Asia.

The disinflationary impact should be most pronounced in oil-importing economies such as the Philippines and Singapore, where fuel has been a major driver of recent inflation pressures. In Singapore, fuel prices accounted for almost 90% of the YoY increase in headline CPI since February 2026. In Australia, transport costs accounted for more than 100% of the increase in headline inflation, offset by weakness elsewhere in the CPI basket. In the Philippines, fuel accounted for roughly 60% of the direct increase in inflation. The overall impact is likely larger once second-round effects through transport, services and other fuel-sensitive categories are taken into account. As lower oil prices feed through, these economies should experience some of the largest declines in inflation across the region.

Food should provide a second source of disinflation in 2027. As El Niño fades in the second half, weather-related pressures on agricultural production should ease. More broadly, demand and supply conditions in key food markets appear more balanced than in recent years, supporting a gradual moderation in food price inflation.

The key wildcard is AI-related inflation. If these price increases persist, second-round effects could become more important through services costs and wages in technology-intensive sectors.

Lower oil prices should help ease inflation, while core pressures could persist Source: CEIC

"> Are food price risks from EL Niño behind us?

Probably not. The current El Niño is expected to remain strong to very strong through 1Q27, and there remains a meaningful risk that weather-related food price pressures persist into next year.

That said, a severe El Niño does not automatically translate into higher inflation. Historical experience is mixed. During both the 2015-16 and 2023-24 El Niño episodes, headline inflation across most of Asia was little changed, with only limited evidence of a broad-based inflation shock. Taiwan was a notable exception in 2015-16. A key reason was that other commodity prices, particularly oil and fertiliser, remained relatively subdued and were generally declining during both episodes.

The inflation impact of El Niño is likely to depend as much on energy prices as on weather conditions themselves. A sustained decline in oil prices would not only lower fuel inflation directly, but also reduce transport, fertiliser and production costs, helping to limit second-round effects on food prices.

This matters particularly for economies such as the Philippines, where food carries a large weight in the CPI basket. Our estimates suggest a 20% decline in fuel prices could lower headline inflation by around 100bp. Evidence from the current episode suggests a mixed and less alarming impact across food commodities. While rice prices have remained relatively contained in both the Philippines and India, wheat and vegetable oil prices have risen more noticeably. Importantly, the latter appear to reflect geopolitical disruptions and broader supply constraints as much as El Niño-related effects.

Food price risks in 2027 nevertheless remain skewed to the upside.

Looking ahead, global wheat production is projected to decline by around 3% in 2026/27, reflecting weaker harvests in major producers including the US, Australia and Argentina. Rice output is also expected to decline by 2% in 2026/27, the first annual decline in a decade, as El Niño weighs on harvests in major Asian exporters. Nevertheless, energy prices are likely to remain the dominant driver of the inflation outlook . Food inflation risks could delay the pace of disinflation in some economies, but lower oil prices should still be the primary force behind headline inflation moderation across most of developing Asia in 2027.

El Nino risks persist, but the inflation impact remains limited and uneven Source: CEIC

"> What does all this mean for central banks?

If we're right about fuel prices correcting, most Asian central banks should gain confidence that inflation is moving sustainably back towards target, opening the door to policy easing in the second half of 2027 to support growth. Japan remains the key exception. Unlike elsewhere in the region, its inflation is increasingly being driven by stronger wage growth, labour shortages and firmer inflation expectations. This should keep the Bank of Japan on a tightening path for longer than the rest of the region.

Growth slowdown should strengthen the case for rate cuts in some economies

Real policy rates are near the upper end of historical ranges across much of Asia, with the notable exceptions of the Philippines and Taiwan. High real rates matter because they increase borrowing costs and tend to weigh on consumption, investment and credit growth.

Growth is already slowing in several economies. Lagged effects of past monetary tightening could weigh on activity into 2027. Despite still-negative real rates, the Philippines has seen growth moderate following an aggressive tightening cycle, while Australia is likely to face a softer growth backdrop. Higher Australian interest rates have weighed on household demand and are beginning to feed through to the housing market. Falling house prices there could further constrain consumption through negative wealth effects, while weaker housing activity may weigh on investment and government revenues. Australia's labour market has also started to show clearer signs of cooling.

Against this backdrop, Australia and the Philippines are the two economies where we see the strongest case for rate cuts in the second half of 2027 as policymakers shift focus from inflation to supporting growth.

The case for easing is less compelling in North Asia

By contrast, growth in Korea and Taiwan is likely to moderate as the AI-driven upswing matures and overheating concerns recede. Even so, inflation should remain close to target, and economic activity should remain relatively resilient. As a result, policy easing is less urgent than in economies such as Australia and the Philippines.

FX considerations could delay easing in India and Indonesia

FX stability may limit the scope for rate cuts in India and Indonesia. Unlike some regional peers, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has historically been reluctant to use interest rates to defend the rupee. However, policymakers recently signalled that rates could help support currency stability if needed. While India's growth and inflation backdrop should balance better in 2027, with inflation closer to target and growth moderating gradually, FX management is an important wildcard. Given the relatively shallow hiking cycle, we don't expect the RBI to come under significant pressure to reverse course and cut rates.

Indonesia faces a different challenge. The rupiah remains one of the region's most interest-rate-sensitive currencies. We expect it to remain among Asia's weakest currencies in 2027. Even if growth softens and inflation stays manageable, Bank Indonesia (BI) may be more cautious about easing policy. Maintaining a sufficiently attractive rate differential and limiting FX volatility will likely remain important policy considerations, suggesting BI may lag other central banks in the easing cycle.

Inflation likely to fall close to central bank targets by 4Q27 Source: CEIC, ING, National central banks

"> Can tech-linked currencies maintain their leadership in 2027?

FX outlook 2027: Rotation underway, but tech currencies should continue to lead

Asian currencies have had a mixed run in 2026. AI-linked currencies such as the KRW, CNY, SGD and MYR generally outperformed, while the INR, IDR and PHP weakened amid softer growth, higher energy prices and domestic challenges. One notable exception among the tech-linked economies is the Taiwanese dollar, which depreciated by around 5% despite strong current account balances, as a tech-sector sell-off in recent months triggered equity outflows.

In 2027, lower oil prices and a softer dollar should provide a more supportive backdrop for Asian FX. However, we think current account balances and capital flows are likely to play a larger role than interest-rate differentials in driving FX performance. While some rotation into South Asian currencies is already underway, we continue to expect tech-linked currencies, particularly the SGD in Southeast Asia and the KRW and TWD in North Asia, to outperform. This is thanks to strong current account surpluses and exporter FX conversion, which provide ongoing support. By contrast, currencies with weaker external positions and less stable capital inflows remain more vulnerable.

Current account surpluses trump rate differentials in 2027

Rate differentials are becoming less supportive for EM Asia. Most Asian central banks are nearing the end of their tightening cycles and are likely to prepare for policy easing during 2027. Interest-rate support for Asian currencies should gradually diminish, particularly for rate-sensitive currencies such as the IDR.

Instead, current account balances and capital flows are likely to play a larger role in driving FX performance. The CNY and KRW have been among the strongest performers since the US-Iran conflict in February 2026, appreciating despite a relatively resilient DXY. This suggests domestic fundamentals are playing a larger role in driving Asian FX than broad dollar movements.

We remain bullish on the KRW, SGD and TWD. The AI cycle may be plateauing, but activity remains high. Strong AI-related exports should continue to support current account surpluses, while exporter FX conversion should help offset capital outflows. In Korea, sizeable equity outflows since September have not prevented KRW appreciation, highlighting the importance of exporter conversion and capital repatriation. Measures to encourage domestic investment and improve shareholder returns could further support the KRW in 2027. Similarly, Japan's efforts to improve domestic returns and shareholder distributions could gradually slow capital outflows over time. So, currencies backed by large current account surpluses, particularly the KRW, TWD and CNY, should be relatively well supported even as rate differentials become less favourable.

The main risk to this view is a sharper-than-expected slowdown in the AI cycle, which could weaken export earnings and reduce current account support for these currencies.

Rotation towards South Asia should continue, but selectively

Post-midterms, there's been a rotation from North Asian to South Asian currencies. The tech sell-off and lower oil prices have improved valuations across parts of South Asia. Falling energy prices should continue to support oil-importing currencies such as the INR, IDR and PHP.

However, tighter global financial conditions mean capital will not be distributed evenly. We remain more constructive on the INR, as growth should remain relatively resilient, supported by supply-chain diversification and continued FDI inflows. By contrast, political uncertainty and weaker capital inflows leave the IDR and PHP more vulnerable.

Broadly, real policy rates should remain supportive, though capital flows and external balances are likely to play a larger role. As inflation eases, real policy rates should become increasingly supportive for Asian currencies, particularly with central banks likely to cut rates only gradually and with a lag. This should keep real rates elevated through much of 2027, supporting FX. The largest beneficiary of this is likely to be the PHP. Disinflation is expected to outpace policy easing, resulting in a meaningful improvement in real rate differentials. That said, real rates are unlikely to be the dominant driver of FX performance, with current account dynamics and capital flows playing a larger role.

Most tech-linked FX have failed to fully reflect strong current account surpluses Note: * data for 3Q26

Source: Bloomberg, CEIC

"> Will resident demand for foreign assets continue to constrain Asian FX?

Resident demand for foreign assets remains a key reason why stronger external balances aren't translating into sustained Asian FX appreciation. Current account surpluses remain supportive for several Asian currencies .

Two structural forces are at work. First, resident demand for foreign assets continues to rise as retail and institutional investors, along with corporates, seek greater diversification and access to higher returns abroad. Second, outbound direct investment remains elevated as firms reposition supply chains and expand overseas operations. These trends are structural and unlikely to reverse quickly.

Taiwan provides a clear example. Corporates continue to diversify production outside China, with investment increasingly directed towards the US and Southeast Asia. The sharp rise in outward direct investment in 2026 reflects long-term supply-chain repositioning. While these outflows have weighed on the TWD, the drag could lessen if the AI cycle moderates in 2026, reducing the need for overseas capex.

Japan remains another important source of regional capital outflows. Domestic institutional investors, including pension funds and investment trusts, remain net buyers of foreign assets as part of long-term portfolio diversification strategies. While some life insurers reduced unhedged foreign bond holdings in August and September as the yen appreciated, the broader trend remains overseas allocation. This has been a key constraint on JPY appreciation. While potential capital repatriation has drawn greater scrutiny since Tokyo moved to stabilise the currency after its sharp drop earlier this year, concerns over Japan's fiscal outlook and government bond supply have dampened appetite for large-scale inflows.

Korea illustrates why capital outflows don't necessarily translate into FX weakness. Residents (including retail investors and the National Pension Scheme) continue to invest heavily abroad, with equity outflows annualising at around $100bn. Corporates have also increased overseas asset accumulation through trade credit and offshore FX deposits. However, Korea's largely AI-driven current account surplus and strong exporter FX conversion will likely be sufficient to offset these outflows, supporting our KRW appreciation view

India has emerged as a growing source of capital outflows, with annual outward FDI more than doubling since 2024 as firms deploy capital overseas rather than domestically. While recent data suggest the pace of growth in outward investment is beginning to plateau, these outflows continue to offset part of India's otherwise strong capital inflows and have limited support for the INR.

Taken together, resident demand for foreign assets is likely to remain a structural constraint on Asian FX appreciation in 2027. Strong current account balances can still support currencies, particularly in economies such as Korea and Taiwan. But persistent outbound investment and portfolio diversification will likely continue to limit appreciation across much of the region.

Persistent resident outflows could continue to limit Asian FX appreciation Source: CEIC, Japan's Ministry of Finance

"> How vulnerable is Asia to a further rise in global bond yields?

Asia is not immune, but better positioned than developed markets

Amid the sharp rise in advanced-economy bond yields and the US-Iran conflict, Asian rates have become more sensitive to US rates in 2026. Looking ahead, Asia is likely to remain exposed to higher global yields as US yields and term premia stay elevated, reflecting worsening fiscal positions among major sovereign issuers and increased debt supply associated with AI-related investment.

Higher global rates would raise debt-servicing costs and put further pressure on fiscal balances across the region. However, Asian sovereigns are generally better positioned than developed market peers to absorb a period of higher borrowing costs. Public debt burdens are typically lower, reliance on foreign investors is generally smaller, and debt maturities are often longer, particularly relative to Europe. This means higher rates should feed through to government interest expenses more gradually.

In addition, many Asian economies benefit from strong domestic savings and deep local investor bases. In several cases, solid external positions provide an important buffer against tighter global financial conditions.

Foreign ownership remains a key vulnerability in some markets

Not all economies are equally insulated. Foreign ownership of government debt remains relatively high in markets such as Indonesia and the Philippines, making them more sensitive to shifts in global risk appetite. As a result, a further rise in global yields could have a larger impact on domestic bond markets and financing costs in these economies.

Japan is an outlier, but near-term risks remain manageable

Japan remains an outlier in gross public debt, estimated at around 205% of GDP in 2026 by the IMF. However, broader measures that net out government cash, deposits, and other financial assets - such as loans and debt securities - reduce net debt to roughly 137% of GDP, according to the IMF.

In the near term, Japan retains significant buffers. The government bond market is deep and liquid, debt maturities are long, debt is issued almost entirely in yen, and substantial public-sector assets provide an additional cushion. These factors should help limit near-term funding risks even if global yields remain elevated.

The longer-term challenge is different. Japan's rising age-related spending and higher interest costs will continue to strain public finances, making fiscal sustainability increasingly dependent on stronger nominal growth.

Near-term risks to Asia debt remain manageable Source: CEIC, IMF

"> Conclusion

In a capital-scarce world, Asia stands out by attracting a growing share of global FDI and remaining at the centre of the AI supply chain, two forces that continue to support the region's external balances.

However, tighter global financial conditions mean capital will become increasingly selective. In FX, we remain constructive on the KRW and TWD, where strong AI-related exports should continue to support current account balances and exporter FX conversion should help offset capital outflows. Measures to encourage repatriation of overseas assets could provide additional tailwind. We also favour the INR due to resilient growth, supply-chain diversification, and steady FDI inflows

For rates, moderating inflation gives most Asian central banks scope to ease policy in 2H27, with Australia and the Philippines offering the strongest cases for rate cuts to support growth. Japan remains the key outlier. Stronger wage growth and more persistent inflation raise the risk of a more hawkish-than-expected BoJ, particularly if domestic demand continues to strengthen. The Bank of Korea, meanwhile, could deliver a surprise cut if the K-shaped growth dynamic widens and domestic growth weakens further.

Overall, we expect growth leadership to broaden as the AI cycle matures. While AI-related sectors and currencies should continue to outperform, lower energy prices, resilient domestic demand and ongoing supply-chain diversification should narrow the gap between the region's winners and laggards.

We extend our sincere appreciation to Sherry Chi for a significant contribution to the research and development of this report.

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