How China Accidentally Broke The West's Arms Trade Monopoly

Latest stories North Korean hackers perfected a playbook for the Binance heist Asia's US investment boom has a leadership problem Demography is destiny: China will grow old before it gets rich

During the 1950s and again in the 1990s and early 2000s, China's armed forces relied heavily on Russian imports for combat aircraft, tanks, submarines, and advanced technology, states the Center for Strategic and International Studies. China's growing domestic capabilities have since turned it into an international arms exporter and a competitor to Russia, even in markets Moscow once dominated.

Interestingly, China remains an important customer for Russia's official arms industry, according to SIPRI. But the flow of goods from China to Russia in support of the war is harder to quantify since much of it consists of civilian goods moving through opaque trading networks and intermediaries.

While a substantial number of Western products are rerouted through China, Chinese-made equipment and components play an increasingly large role in sustaining Russia's war effort and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine's.

China's dominant and still-growing share of global vehicle production has created a vast industrial base for Russia to draw on for military use. Russian forces have purchased hundreds of light armored personnel carriers from Shaanxi Baoji Special Vehicle Manufacturing Co. , Ltd ., as well as all-terrain vehicles produced by Shandong Odes Industry Co., Ltd. Meanwhile, Chinese antennas are used in electronic-warfare systems to disrupt communications and navigation.

Chinese companies also supply the industrial machinery and other inputs that Russian factories need to manufacture weapons and ammunition. These include milling machines for cutting and shaping metal, lathes for turning metal into precise components, and computer numerical control (CNC) technology to automate manufacturing.

The full scale of Russian dependence on China is difficult to establish, but multiple analyses point to Beijing's significant role as a supplier. The Jamestown Foundation estimated that in 2023, up to 90% of Russia's“metalworking machine tools” came from China.

Analysis by the Kyiv School of Economics has found that China accounted for roughly three-quarters of Russia's reported imports of Common High-Priority goods, including integrated circuits, microelectronics, communication hardware, and optical devices.

By 2024,“Chinese exports to Russia reached $27 billion in machinery, $16 billion in electronics and $5 billion in telecom equipment-all well above pre-sanction levels,” according to Bob Savic, head of international trade and sanctions consulting at the Global Policy Institute.

Given how extensively the Russian economy has been reoriented toward its war effort, much of these imports likely supports military production.

China's global reach and unintended consequences

China's centrality in the global arms market has created issues for US security interests elsewhere. North Korea, for example, has expanded arms cooperation with Russia while maintaining extensive trade with China, offering Pyongyang the means to sustain and upgrade its own weapons production.

This dynamic can also be seen in Iran. After US and Israeli attacks on Iranian missile infrastructure throughout 2026,“Russia has coordinated rebuilds using Chinese CNC machining centers and inertial guidance gyroscopes,” according to Savic, while Russia also serves as a conduit for Chinese microchips used in drones and other military equipment.

Since 2015, the Houthis have meanwhile faced Saudi Arabia and UAE military forces-both major recipients of American arms-as well as US and Israeli strikes. A new Saudi-led coalition involving Turkey and Pakistan to combat the Houthis was announced in October after a major Houthi offensive. Egypt later decided to extend military support to Saudi Arabia.

Access to Chinese components has helped the Houthis develop more capable weapons and sustain their attacks. The Middle East Research Observatory states that“[b]etween 2021 and 2025, roughly 35% of military items captured en route to the Houthis originated in China, up from 5% between 2015 and 2018.”

In 2024, the US Treasury Department singled out Chinese companies Shenzhen Jinghon Electronics, Ltd.; Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports Co., Ltd.; and Shenzhen Rion Technology Co., Ltd. for supplying dual-use and military-grade components to Houthi networks involved in drone and missile development.

In October 2026, the Wall Street Journal reported that Conflict Armament Research had identified Chinese-sourced motor parts, airframe sections, and solid-propellant materials in an advanced Houthi ballistic missile.

These transfers do not establish that Beijing intended to support Houthi attacks. The armed groups' missile and drone strikes on Saudi Arabia, a major Chinese trading partner, run counter to Beijing's economic interests and show how difficult it is to control the end use of goods moving through global markets.

Meanwhile,“Saudi Arabia is signaling its displeasure, but it is unlikely to risk a confrontation with China, its largest trading partner and a major buyer of its oil, even as those weapons threaten its security,” stated Al-Monitor.

Chinese-made equipment has also appeared in other conflicts where Beijing has little obvious interest in escalation. In Sudan, Chinese drone jammers, surface-to-air missiles, and other equipment have been observed, including in the hands of the Rapid Support Forces, with reported supply links to the United Arab Emirates. Chinese-made drones have also reportedly appeared in Libya despite a UN arms embargo.