Data Centers In The Line Of Fire Of Ukraine War

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Typically, data centres use redundancy and backups to make sure losing a single facility does not have permanent negative consequences. Even so, the Iranian strikes resulted in long-term degradation of services and irrecoverable loss of some data.

Russian data centres may have less in the way of international redundancy options. This is due to a particular vision of“digital sovereignty”, which Moscow has actively championed over the past decade.

The idea that nations should have autonomy and control over their own digital data and infrastructure is a sound one. However, Russia's pursuit of“sovereignty” has enabled it to censor online information and isolate Russian users from global internet services.

Russia passed laws requiring certain data to be stored locally in 2015. These were followed by international sanctions after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As a result, Russia's options for maintaining backup infrastructure abroad have been significantly limited.

Disinformation and influence

Disinformation is often considered as the strategic spreading of deliberate falsehoods. Governments have often tried to fight it by removing or debunking these falsehoods on the platforms where they circulate.

However, influence operations work in many different ways. Not all of them propagate falsehoods. Most of them aim to undermine public trust and delegitimise democratic processes and institutions.

In Australia's 2023 referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, for example, campaigners generated plausible competing narratives to exacerbate political polarisation. In New Zealand, influence operations have involved avalanches of misogynistic abuse to derail public support for policy initiatives.

Russia is known for its orchestrated interventions in democratic politics around the world. The goal of these interventions has often been to sow dissent, distrust and dismay. Supporting candidates with pro-Russian stances can also be a goal.

Civil society and activist communities have developed creative approaches to tackling this problem. These have included debunking, prebunking (preemptively countering false claims), reporting misleading content to platforms, or strategically using humor and memes.

Digital sovereignty can create points of weakness

The data center attacks in Russia are a reminder that Russian internet services – including influence operations – depend on physical infrastructure.

Whether or not the strikes have led to a significant reduction in disinformation bot activity this time around, targeting the physical sources of disinformation may still be an effective way to contain it.

There are over 100 data centers operating on Russian territory. Few of them have backups and resilience plans in place.

Concentrating all digital operations in a relatively small number of physical sites creates a vulnerability. Once this infrastructure is hit, rebuilding can be slow and challenging, especially as Russia is reliant on China to supply advanced semiconductors.

Lessons for democracies

What does this mean for efforts to counter Russian disinformation and influence operations more broadly?