Anduril's Plan To Save US Sub Edge From China's Undersea Surge

The scale of that industrial deficit is severe. A January 2026 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that while the US Navy aims to achieve a fleet goal of 66 SSNs, actual construction has never reached that threshold and has averaged just 1.1 to 1.2 boats per year since 2022 because of persistent workforce shortages, supplier bottlenecks, and component delays.

The CRS report notes that the US Navy is now pushing to raise production to 2.0 boats annually and eventually 2.33 per year to reduce backlogs, sustain domestic fleet requirements, and build replacements for three to five Virginia-class SSNs slated for sale to Australia under the AUKUS security pact.

These ongoing industrial delays affect Western Pacific operations, where attack submarines are vital to the US in a possible conflict with China over Taiwan, and forward deployments reaffirm their strategic importance.

Demonstrating that operational footprint, a June 2026 report by the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI), a Chinese think tank, found that in 2025 the US operated at least 11 nuclear-powered submarines in three Western Pacific operational corridors-the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Java Sea-to demonstrate forward presence and signal a clear undersea deterrence posture against China.

In a high-intensity Taiwan conflict, that forward undersea posture forms the tip of the US spear. In a May 2026 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Seth Jones says US SSNs provide an asymmetric operational advantage over China by exploiting the latter's persistent anti-submarine warfare (ASW) deficiencies.

Jones notes that in simulated Taiwan Strait conflict scenarios, SSNs play a critical warfighting role by inflicting heavy attrition on Chinese invasion forces and hunting high-value amphibious vessels, surface escorts, and logistics ships.

Beyond direct strikes against transport fleets, he says these submarines screen against Chinese submarines attempting to break out past the First Island Chain, routinely cycling back to forward ports such as Yokosuka, Japan, to reload weapons and resume offensive hunting operations.

Yet dominating the undersea battlespace will prove far more contested than in previous conflicts. Rear Admiral Mike Brookes said in March 2026, in testimony before the US Congress, that China does not approach ASW as isolated platform engagements.

Instead, Brookes points out that China frames ASW as a networked“systems confrontation,” integrating air, surface, and seabed sensors, along with unmanned vehicles, into an anti-submarine warfare system-of-systems designed to control critical waters, compel adversary submarines to withdraw, and reduce port-departure detection risks for Chinese vessels.

Broadly, Brookes says China views undersea warfare as a crucial strategic enabler for naval operations under its“Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection” doctrine, central to US-China competition, supporting near-seas defense, ballistic missile submarine protection, sea-lane interdiction, and strikes against high-value targets such as allied aircraft carriers.

China is backing this doctrinal focus with unprecedented quantitative expansion. Outlining the growth of China's submarine fleet, Brookes says that it now has about 60 units and could reach 70 by 2027 by adding up to six nuclear guided-missile submarines (SSGN), two nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and retiring older Chinese and Russian-built units. He adds that China could field over 80 submarines by 2035, with nuclear-powered boats making up half the fleet.

China's large submarine industrial base supports that growth. In a September 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report, Sarah Kirchberger notes that China's submarine industrial base drives rapid fleet expansion through massive state funding, state-owned bank credits, and infrastructure modernization across Bohai, Wuchang, and Jiangnan shipyards, which employ modular assembly, covered construction halls and commercial-military integration.

However, Kirchberger points out that persistent production bottlenecks curb qualitative parity with Western designs. She says China still grapples with acoustic-quieting deficiencies, vibration-suppression gaps, and reactor design issues, leaving boats vulnerable to detection by allied sonar arrays.