US-Australia Hypersonic Push No Silver Bullet Against China

Looking at tactical use-case scenarios for the HACM, Michael White mentions in a February 2026 Atlantic Council report that hypersonic weapons provide the US military with rapid, survivable left-of-launch kinetic capabilities to penetrate heavily defended adversary anti-access perimeters, de-contesting battlefields by destroying high-speed strike systems, integrated air defenses, and command nodes within compressed decision timescales.

White says hypersonic weapons operate as critical force multipliers alongside legacy subsonic arsenals; they defeat time-critical targets early in a conflict to restore battlefield preeminence.

He places the HACM within that strike network, offering distinct operational flexibility: its smaller footprint and lower unit cost let the US deploy it affordably across a wide range of aircraft.

While officials have not shared specific details about the test, an August 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report mentions that the HACM is designed for launch from both fighter aircraft and bombers, with flight test integration focusing on the F-15E, with potential capacity for a B-52 to carry 20 or more missiles and a B-1 up to 36.

In addition to US aircraft, a July 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report notes that the HACM could be tested with Australian F/A-18s, with implications for interoperability, strategic depth and resilience, and the development of Australia's long-range strike capability.

In an operational campaign over Taiwan, allied doctrine envisions heavy bombers operating from sanctuary bases beyond the First and Second Island Chains - such as Australia's Tindall Air Base - functioning primarily as standoff 'missile trucks' to saturate Chinese air defense nodes and neutralize mobile missile launchers before release.

Highlighting the vulnerability of US bases within the First and Second Island Chains, a December 2024 Stimson Center report notes that Chinese missile strikes could deplete theater interceptors within 24 hours, crater runways, ground US fighters in Japan for nearly 12 days, and ground aerial refueling tankers in Japan for more than a month and in Guam for four days.

Compounding these vulnerabilities, a January 2025 Hudson Institute report highlighted that decades of underinvestment have left forward US facilities unhardened compared with China's network of over 3,000 aircraft shelters, creating a similar asymmetry in which just 10 submunition-armed missiles could neutralize critical installations like Japan's US Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni.

As such, Stacie Pettyjohn mentions in a November 2024 Carnegie Endowment report that facilities such as Tindall would function as indispensable staging grounds for US long-range bomber operations during an allied campaign to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Pettyjohn notes that US bombers such as the B-52, B-1, and B-2, operating from northern Australia, allow the US Air Force to generate sustained sorties with stealthy and non-stealthy heavy bombers, delivering massed standoff cruise and hypersonic missiles against Chinese invasion fleets and mainland military targets while preserving strategic operational depth.

However, northern Australia provides no guaranteed sanctuary against the Chinese military's expanding deep-strike envelope. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the DF-26 fired from Hainan Island, paired with South China Sea-deployed H-6N bombers armed with JL-1 aeroballistic missiles, place Tindall within reach of preemptive salvos that could destroy unhardened bombers on the flight line.

In response, the US, under its Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, which entails rapidly moving and dispersing aircraft across multiple sites in the Pacific, has restored former World War II bomber bases, such as Tinian, to serve as alternative staging areas should facilities such as Guam and possibly Tindall be taken out of action.