Erdogan Playing East And West, Winning Room To Maneuver

This can appear inconsistent or merely tactical. But, as I argue in my new book“Turkey, Geopolitics, and the Age of Populist World-Making,” the country's stance reflects a broader objective. It seeks to expand its freedom of action by preventing any single alliance from defining its international role.

Erdogan presents Turkey not as a peripheral country caught between rival worlds, but as a power capable of shaping the global system. This extends his domestic populist strategy onto the international stage.

Just as the Turkish people are portrayed as having been silenced by entrenched elites at home, Turkey is represented as a nation denied its rightful status by Western-dominated hierarchies globally.

In my book, I call this“populist world-making” - an effort to recast international politics as a struggle between those who have historically controlled the global order and those whose agency and status have been repressed.

Erdogan does not regard the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as an alternative to NATO. He sees it as another arena for pursuing economic, political and strategic relationships without the West being the sole source of international authority.

Turkey effectively shops among institutions, coalitions and diplomatic processes. It crosses supposedly fixed boundaries whenever this can expand its influence or reduce external constraints.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the latest expression of this approach. In Libya, Turkey militarily supported the internationally recognized government and sharply criticized France and other NATO allies for backing its opponents.

By contrast, the country pursued what I call“competitive co-existence” with Russia, which also supported the opposing faction: Turkey moderated its rhetoric and avoided direct clashes with Russian forces.

Turkish-French rivalry extended into the African Sahel region, where Turkey boosted trade, aid and defense cooperation - including drone sales - by stoking the flames of the growing resentment of governments in the region about France's military presence and post-colonial influence.

In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey aggressively challenged the French-supported co-operation among Greece, Cyprus and Israel on maritime jurisdiction and energy co-operation that it regarded as exclusionary.

Syria provides an even clearer example of Turkey's penchant for forum shopping. Turkey, in line with other NATO members, opposed Bashar al-Assad. But it worked with Russia and Iran through the exclusive Astana process to manage their conflicting objectives and de-escalate armed conflict in Syria.

Despite supporting opposing entities and pursuing incompatible objectives, the three states created a diplomatic forum outside the Western-led Geneva framework because it served their respective interests.

Turkey's complex relationship with Russia is part of the same trend. It opposed Russia's invasion of Ukraine, armed Kyiv and closed Turkish waters to Russian warships.