Cambodia An Early Warning Of China's AI Surveillance Exports

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Instead, Phnom Penh has doubled down on China, to the point that the country is now Cambodia's largest foreign direct investor and is deeply involved in major infrastructure projects, including the Funan Techo Canal and expansion of the Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand.

China's growing role in Cambodia's security apparatus has fueled concerns about Beijing's long-term strategic influence and raised questions about where, exactly, Cambodia's geopolitical loyalties lie.

Economic dependence, military cooperation and political alignment reinforce one another. The more deeply these relationships become embedded, the harder it will be for a future Cambodian government to change direction without confronting powerful interests at home and abroad.

Technology could make that dependence still harder to unwind. Artificial intelligence and digital surveillance tools offer governments new capabilities to track, identify and intimidate populations.

China is already rolling out new AI-enabled surveillance technologies, while Cambodia is developing comparable infrastructure through its China-backed“Smart Police” initiative and using it to crack down on dissenting voices.

Activists have feared this development for years, with experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warning as far back as 2022 that Chinese surveillance technology was being deployed in more than 50 countries.

Through this so-called Digital Silk Road, China has exported such technology while helping shape cyber laws and internet infrastructure abroad, extending Beijing's influence over how information is managed and controlled.

For Cambodians, the danger posed by this is not abstract. Attacks on opposition voices and critics of the regime are already commonplace, including beyond Cambodia's borders. Expanding the state's ability to identify, track, and monitor individuals could give authorities in Phnom Penh powerful new tools to target those already vulnerable to intimidation and repression.

As technological cooperation between China and other authoritarian governments deepens, such repression could become more systematic, less visible, and harder to challenge. In Cambodia, where democratic institutions have been steadily weakened and meaningful oversight is limited, there are few safeguards to prevent technologies presented as tools of public security from being turned against the government's critics.

For Cambodia's younger generation, this is a deeply frustrating trajectory. Many hoped Hun Manet represented a chance for a different future. A younger leader could have embraced greater political openness, strengthened independent institutions and built a more balanced relationship with China and democratic partners.

Instead, political space remains restricted, while Cambodia's international partnerships increasingly reinforce the authoritarian model built under his father.

This should serve as a warning to Southeast Asia. Chinese influence is no longer confined to diplomacy, investment, and military cooperation; it is increasingly reinforced through technology and the exchange of governance models that reach deeper into state institutions and, potentially, the daily lives of ordinary citizens.