Iran Threat To Cut Hormuz Undersea Cables Puts Gulf On Edge

To demonstrate the scale of this risk, the key cable networks include the Fibre in Gulf submarine cable system, which connects Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. There is also the Falcon Network, which connects Bahrain, Egypt, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Yemen.

The Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1) network, with landing sites in Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE, linking southeast Asia to Europe via Egypt. And the Gulf Bridge International, which links Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and has onward connectivity to India and Europe.

With that web of connections funnelled through the Strait of Hormuz, an international waterway that has long been of strategic importance for oil and gas has taken on a new significance as a choke point for global undersea infrastructure.

What makes the Strait of Hormuz and the rest of the Gulf region particularly vulnerable to an attack on the CUI is the shallow water. With an average depth of 50 meters and a maximum depth of less than 100 meters, those who might wish to attack the CUI network do not need the sort of high-end capabilities of Russia's Gugi agency. Gugi, which is the Russian acronym for the Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research, is responsible for underwater sabotage and espionage.

Remotely operated vehicles (ROV) with working depths of thousands of metres are commonplace in the oil and gas industry. There are growing numbers of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) with similar operating parameters in that field. Both can be repurposed and used for offensive operations.

Iran has already debuted its own mine clearance ROV, and there may be other capabilities which it has not chosen to publicize. The shallowness of the Persian Gulf puts most of it well within the depths military divers are able to operate. We could also see the sort of blunt threat posed by a ship“accidentally” dragging its anchor to cut cables in the manner we have witnessed in the Baltic.

So it's entirely feasible that Iran could conduct attacks against the CUI network. And the threat has already affected planned extensions or new elements of this undersea infrastructure. Several projects have been put on hold after their owners or contractors declared they can't safely operate in the Gulf.

This neatly illustrates the impact of conflict on the ability to maintain and extend the cables carrying so much of the world's trade and communication. In the context of the Middle East, that will have a direct impact on the ambitions of Gulf States to become AI-enabled economies.

Iran clearly appreciates the strategic and operational significance of the regional CUI network and will have put significant effort into mapping it. It is also reasonable to assume that it will have a trained force of divers able to operate at depths that would enable them to reach the cables across the Persian Gulf seabed.

We know that they have an ROV designed for mine clearance operations – and it's highly likely operate other assets in support of a well-developed offshore oil industry.

The most important question is what would the Iranians be prepared to do?