Houthis Tighten Grip on Bab el-Mandeb Strait

(MENAFN) The Houthis largely limit their involvement to statements of support when the Israel/US-Iran war begins on Feb. 28, despite retaining both the weapons and willingness to intervene. Their limited response appears to reflect a decision to wait for Tehran to determine how and when its regional allies should become more directly involved.

That moment now arrives. In recent days, Houthi forces take control of Mocha and Dhubab and seize Perim Island, also known as Mayyun, a strategically important island that divides the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The group consequently gains control over much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the main maritime entrance to the area.

The Bab el-Mandeb serves as a major global shipping route, carrying about 12% of worldwide trade, 11% of seaborne oil and 8% of LNG. While disruption in the strait alone could be managed through alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope, such a diversion would increase transportation costs and extend journeys.

The situation becomes more serious because the Strait of Hormuz is already effectively closed during the conflict. With both major maritime chokepoints disrupted or facing threats, Saudi Arabia loses an important alternative route for moving its energy exports.

The Houthis previously focused much of their military pressure on Riyadh as part of the broader rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Following the restoration of relations between the two countries, however, their activity decreases and their attention shifts elsewhere.

The group subsequently concentrates its attacks on Israel before turning its attention back toward Saudi Arabia, including its infrastructure, energy installations and export corridors. From a purely domestic Yemeni perspective, the repeated pattern of escalation, de-escalation and sudden changes in military focus can appear difficult to explain. Viewed through the wider structure of Iran’s regional network, however, the shifts appear more coordinated.

The Houthis have long relied on missiles, drones and guided projectiles to project military power far beyond what might be expected from a force of their size. These weapons allow them to threaten Saudi energy facilities, cities in the south and commercial shipping at relatively low cost and with limited warning.

Their expanding control along the coastline and around Perim Island now provides additional tactical capabilities that are more difficult to neutralize. Artillery, anti-tank weapons and mines can be deployed effectively at shorter distances and against targets within direct line of sight.

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