What Iran's Resilience Tells China, Russia About US Power

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That relationship has only grown more consequential during the war. As Washington works to cut off Iran's oil exports and related financial channels, China remains one of the few major economies able to absorb part of the pressure on Tehran.

For Beijing, buying Iranian oil is not simply a commercial transaction - it's part of a larger contest over how far US sanctions can dictate the behavior of major economies outside Washington's orbit. That is also why US pressure on Chinese buyers has become a persistent point of friction between the two powers.

China's support isn't limited to economics, either. US reports in recent years have pointed to Iranian access to certain dual-use technologies, including some used in its drone and missile programs, through companies and commercial networks linked to China.

A distinction should be drawn between official Chinese government policy and the activities of China-based commercial networks. Still, those networks illustrate how the economic relationship helps preserve part of Iran's technological and industrial base under sanctions.

Diplomatically, Beijing has likewise declined to support Iran's complete isolation. China, alongside Russia, has repeatedly called for a political resolution and opposed international measures it considers unilateral pressure on Iran.

That doesn't mean Beijing is committed to defending Iran militarily - it continues to seek an end to the war and stability along energy routes. But there's a meaningful difference between ending the war and ending it with Iran severely weakened and the regional balance tilted toward Washington.

This is where Iran's resilience matters most for China. The more Tehran shows it can maintain its response capability after heavy attacks, the more complicated Beijing's calculus becomes about the consequences of a decisive Iranian defeat.

China doesn't need to enter the war to support Iran. Its economic, commercial, technological and diplomatic tools let it resist Tehran's total isolation without becoming a direct party to the conflict.

Perhaps the most valuable thing China is gaining from this war, though, is neither oil nor its relationship with Tehran, but a strategic lesson about the United States itself. The conflict has let Beijing observe US forces' actual performance in a high-intensity war, including with regard to long-range strikes, air operations, ammunition consumption, logistics, missile defense and more.

For a country whose future competition with Washington centers heavily on Taiwan, that experience is far from trivial.

Russia's stake is different

Russia's calculation diverges from China's. Moscow doesn't share Beijing's dependence on Middle Eastern energy, and higher energy prices can even create short-term advantages for the Russian economy. For the Kremlin, the Iran question is bound up instead with Russia's position in Eurasia and the prospects for a multipolar order.

Iran is not just a regional partner for Moscow - it's one of the few powers simultaneously locked in conflict with the US and Israel, capable of pulling some geopolitical pressure on Russia away from Europe and Ukraine and toward the Middle East.

A recent analysis in Middle East Policy argues the war has created short-term strategic advantages for Russia while raising Iran's importance to both Russia's regional standing and its relationship with China.

Evidence of Russia-Iran military cooperation extends well beyond politics. Financial Times reporting indicates that Russian experts have worked with Iran since 2023, under a secret program, to develop propulsion technology for hypersonic cruise missiles - cooperation that continued into 2026. Other reports point to satellite cooperation and transfers of military equipment between the two countries.

None of this amounts to a formal military alliance. Neither China nor Russia has extended Iran a security guarantee comparable to the mutual commitments of a formal defense pact.

But that informal cooperation may be the most important feature of these relationships today: both powers can use economic, technological and diplomatic tools to strengthen Iran's capabilities and constrain US pressure without committing to a direct war with Washington.

Emerging new global order

Ultimately, the significance of the US-Israeli war against Iran doesn't hinge only on who gains the upper hand on the battlefield. The larger question is whether the United States can still use its military and economic superiority to impose its preferred political outcome on a regional power.