Bangladesh's J-10CE Fighter Plan Stirs China Dependence Fears

Together, they could give Bangladesh a high-low fighter mix, with J-10s assigned to more demanding air-superiority missions and JF-17s handling routine combat air patrol and strike duties.

Chinese fighters are a logical modernization option given their comparatively low cost, Bangladesh's decades of experience operating Chinese equipment and established procurement ties with China.

Pakistan's reported J-10CE performance against India in May 2025 may have depended as much on the wider combat network supporting the fighters as on the aircraft themselves. Pakistan operated the jets within a broader Chinese-origin ecosystem, meaning acquiring the J-10CE alone may not reproduce the capabilities demonstrated during the clashes.

During the clashes, Pakistan's Chinese-made ground-based air defenses reportedly targeted Indian aircraft, while Pakistan's China-made fighters launched missiles guided by a Chinese-origin airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.

Dependence on that ecosystem also exposes buyers to platform reliability and supply-chain risks. For instance, JF-17 fighters supplied to Myanmar have reportedly suffered structural and technical issues, with the airframes vulnerable to damage during high-G maneuvers.

Additional alleged defects include maintenance and accuracy issues with the JF-17's KLJ-7 Al radar and malfunctions in the aircraft's weapon mission management computer, which hinder the type's beyond-visual-range combat capability.

The JF-17s in Myanmar's service also suffer from a lack of spare parts because Western sanctions on Myanmar have prevented Myanmar from obtaining the Western avionics and electronics installed in the type.

Over the past 20 years, China has provided Bangladesh with ships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and missile systems, accounting for 70% of the country's arms purchases. But the strategic significance of those sales extends beyond the weapons themselves to the support architecture required to keep them operational.

High-end weapons systems depend on ongoing spare parts, maintenance, software updates, training, and access to suppliers over many years. These dependencies establish channels of influence for China that extend well beyond the initial transaction, aligning clients' foreign policy, defense, and economic interests more closely with China's own.

While these procurements cannot overturn India's regional air superiority of 29 fighter squadrons, they significantly narrow Bangladesh's tactical capability gap and bolster airspace patrolling.

Crucially, they complicate Indian defense planning in the vicinity of the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, a roughly 20-kilometer-wide land corridor linking India's northeastern states to the rest of the country. India may consequently have to devote greater planning attention and some additional resources to its eastern approaches, particularly during wider regional contingencies.

While India and Bangladesh have no active territorial disputes, relations have deteriorated since the August 2024 ouster of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose close relationship with India became a source of resentment among some of her domestic opponents.

India has also strengthened its military posture around the Siliguri Corridor amid longstanding concerns about the vulnerability of the narrow land bridge linking the country's northeast to the rest of the country.