South Korea Walks A Narrow Bridge Between China And Japan

The official Chinese readout from the visit was explicit in promoting the idea that the two countries should join hands against Japan:

Lee was ready to accommodate Xi in one key respect-the reaffirmation of South Korea's standing policy on Taiwan. He told Xi that he“respects” China's position on“one China.”

He made a nod toward China's and Korea's shared history of opposition to Japanese imperialism. Contrary to the words of the Chinese readout, the Republic of Korea itself wasn't founded until 1948, but many Koreans found ways to oppose Japan's colonial rule between 1910 and the 1945 liberation. Lee on this China visit made a symbolic stop in Shanghai to mark the anniversary of the birth of one of the most prominent of those, Kim Ku, who led a Korean government in exile there.

Otherwise, as foreign policy scholar Moon Chung-in had anticipated in an interview with this writer, Lee was“much more prudent on Beijing's push for collective action against Takaichi's remarks on history” as he tried to balance South Korea's strategic cooperative relationship with China while“retaining its alliance with the US.”

Lee left more empty-handed in his effort to secure Xi's support in pressing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to return to dialogue and engagement with South Korea. Despite vague words about dialogue, there was no mention of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, much less any reiteration of past statements supporting the“denuclearization” of the peninsula, a formula sought by Seoul.

For the next stop in President Lee's diplomatic obstacle course, Japan, he is heading to what many hope will be a breakthrough meeting with Takaichi, hosted by the currently popular leader in her hometown of Nara, some thirty minutes east of Osaka.

The two leaders had a friendly forty-five-minute meeting on the sidelines of the APEC conference, where Lee went out of his way to defy a widely held view of him as“anti-Japanese.” He embraced a“forward-looking” relationship, building on progress made by the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration and his Japanese counterparts.

This has led to expectations that the two leaders can forge an unexpected partnership, based in part on shared apprehensions about China and an unspoken need to coordinate a response to the Trump administration.

“The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific makes it even more necessary for these leaders to collaborate,” wrote Japanese scholar Ayumi Teraoka in Foreign Affairs.“In particular, Washington's renewed unpredictability and waning engagement in multilateral forums require Japan and South Korea to work together to sustain regional public goods and protect their interests.”

This optimism rests on several untested assumptions-that difficult issues of wartime and colonial history that have bedeviled the relationship can be put aside and Takaichi can bury her well-known conservative nationalist views and mirror the pragmatism of Lee. And it also assumes that the two leaders have a shared view of the regional security situation.

The two-day Nara visit could go smoothly if they steer clear of difficult questions. But there are already signs that this may be a challenge, especially for the Japanese prime minister. She did not hesitate to proclaim that the disputed islands of Dokdo (Takeshima for Japan) are being“illegally occupied.” Takaichi regularly and defiantly visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to Japan's war dead and has left open the possibility that she would go as prime minister.

Lee is committed to establishing a working relationship with Takaichi.“His shuttle diplomacy with Takaichi in Nara on Jan. 13 will go well as long as she does not provoke him on Dokdo or other history issues,” predicts Yonsei University scholar Moon.

But it may not be enough to momentarily avoid sensitive subjects. Real progress remains to be made on resolving these issues, including compensation for forced labor victims and their families from decades ago – an issue that could lead to seizure of Japanese corporate assets. For Korean progressives, simply focusing on the strategic situation is not sufficient.