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New Zealand is well-positioned to champion those concerns while also serving as a voice of moderation within Western coalitions. It is a Western-aligned democracy and a member of the Five Eyes intelligence network – yet its foreign policy tradition places emphasis on independent diplomacy, from its nuclear-free stance in the 1980s to its support for Pacific-led solutions today.

This enables Wellington to act as a mediator – a neutral bridge between great powers and Pacific states. Rather than forcing island nations into binary choices, New Zealand can help carve out a middle path that safeguards Pacific agency.

New Zealand will soon be tested on thorny questions like Taiwan's role in the Pacific Islands Forum and reforms to the forum's partnership structures. Rather than lobbying on behalf of Washington or Beijing, Wellington should ensure that Pacific voices drive the process.

• Crucially, it must also resist reducing the region to an ideological battlefield of“democracy versus autocracy.” Resonating in Suva, Port Vila and Apia will not be mere slogans but tangible commitments:
• climate adaptation funding,
• abor mobility,education and
• infrastructure.

New Zealand is well-placed to lead in these areas - and to broker dialogue when outside powers overstep.

Wellington's dilemma: credibility, coherence and autonomy

New Zealand's credibility rests not on warships but on consistency. New Zealand's dependence on China is often understated. Its deep economic ties with Beijing leave it exposed if China perceives Wellington as drifting too far into Washington's orbit.

In the year ending December 2024, New Zealand exported NZ$20.85 billion in goods and services to China - about 20–21% of its total exports, nearly double what it exports to its next-largest markets, the United States and Australia combined . Meanwhile, imports from China in 2024 totaled about US$10.19 billion , spanning electronics, machinery, furniture, plastics, and vehicles.

In other words, Chinese demand underpins a large slice of New Zealand's economy. But the returns are uneven – exports fell from a 2022 peak of NZ$20.1 billion to NZ$17.8 billion in 2024 , narrowing the surplus and raising concerns about overreliance.

As trade ties deepen, so does the risk of economic coercion. Beijing has, in other theaters, used tariffs, informal barriers, or regulatory scrutiny as leverage. For New Zealand, that leverage is asymmetric: losing Chinese access would be materially worse than a Beijing cutoff of the US markets.

On the security front, New Zealand is embedded in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (with the US, UK, Australia and Canada). In April 2024, New Zealand and the United States issued a joint declaration reaffirming their strategic partnership . Intelligence sharing under Five Eyes has bolstered New Zealand's resilience against foreign interference and espionage . Its recent moves – stepping up defense cooperation with Australia and the US – risk casting it as another extension of a US-led containment strategy.

Yet Wellington retains a measured posture. New Zealand officials have occasionally expressed “unease” at expanding Five Eyes' remit into political messaging or public diplomacy, and outlets such as Al Jazeera have noted Wellington's reluctance to let the alliance dictate its China policy. Historically, New Zealand has resisted automatic alignment – preferring to issue independent statements on Beijing – and analysts at RSIS observe that this“hedging” strategy helps Wellington preserve diplomatic flexibility.

New Zealand's strategic opportunity: bridge, not proxy

Rather than forcing island states into binary choices, New Zealand should help open new pathways of cooperation, anchored on island priorities. 's enduring value in the Pacific lies in trustnot coercion.

Its ability to reclaim the mediator role speaks credibly to both Beijing and Washington and translates great-power ambitions into Pacific-relevant terms – ensuring that sovereignty and agency are not sidelined, if managed carefully.

A concerted push toward defense integration could undermine that trust; likewise, acquiescing to Chinese pressure would fracture relationships with traditional allies.

For Pacific nations, ideology is not the central concern. The pressing challenges are climate change, infrastructure resilience, labor mobility and sustainable development. In those domains, Wellington focuses on substance over symbol – delivering results rather than posturing. In regional forums (PIF, APEC, etc.), Wellington should push for reform in partnership structures so that island voices matter more than superpower agendas.

When contested questions arise – Taiwan's status, or security protocols in the PIF – New Zealand's role demands both courage and discipline. Its strategy should be to safeguard Pacific agenda-setting, rather than to advocate for either Washington's or Beijing's position.

Wellington should push back when Washington demands lockstep alignment – reminding allies that small states must retain strategic voice. At the same time, New Zealand must resist the notion that export dependence on China equates to political acquiescence. If New Zealand can walk this line, it will remain a trusted bridge between the Pacific and the wider world. If not, it risks irrelevance in the very region that has long anchored its identity.

A test of credibility and autonomy

Pacific nations are watching closely. The 2025 PIF made clear that Pacific nations want partners, not pawns. If Wellington can embody that distinction – by working as a neutral mediator alongside external powers on shared security concerns, maintaining open diplomatic channels with China, and above all, prioritizing Pacific-defined agendas – it may continue to act as a trusted bridge to the wider world.