China's DF-61 ICBM Points At US Nuke Silo Vulnerability

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Wood and others note that while silo-based missiles gave China an intercontinental capability in the 1980s, their small numbers and fixed positions made them vulnerable.

They say that the introduction of road-capable ICBMs in the early 2000s improved survivability by allowing missiles to disperse from garrisons and operate from concealed“field” positions.

They mention this mobility, combined with advances in missile technology and the expansion of mobile ICBM units, has markedly strengthened China's deterrent by ensuring that retaliatory forces could endure a first strike and still launch.

In contrast, a December 2021 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that while the US experimented with road-mobile and tunnel ICBM concepts alongside silo basing during the Cold War, these options proved to be very expensive and impractical, and were eventually dropped due to cost and complexity.

However, the increasing vulnerability of US silo-based ICBMs and its air and sea-based nuclear arsenal may present a valid argument to reconsider mobile land-based options.

Toby Dalton and others mention in an August 2022 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) report that hypersonic boost-glide weapons could enable China or Russia to threaten US missile silos within the coming decades, well before the LGM-35 Sentinel's projected 2075 end-of-service life.

The LGM-35 is intended to replace the long-serving LGM-30 Minuteman III, in service since the 1970s. Dalton and others warn that a non-nuclear strike on silos would force the US president into a perilous choice: launch ICBMs before destruction or escalate with other nuclear forces, potentially in response to a conventional attack.

They also point out that under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the US kept only one warhead per LGM-30 ICBM, making them less inviting for a disarming first strike against Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)-armed missiles.

However, they state that the expiry of New START in February 2026 may prompt US policymakers to arm LGM-35 or LGM-30 ICBMs with multiple warheads , making them tempting targets for adversaries and forcing a debate on whether silo basing remains viable.

In May 2025, the Trump Administration unveiled the“Golden Dome” missile defense system, which aims to shoot down ICBMs, missiles, and drones threatening the US mainland using satellite sensors, kinetic interceptors on sea, air, and land platforms, and directed-energy weapons, with AI linking all these components.

Such a system would enhance the survivability of the US silo-based ICBM force by increasing its chances of withstanding a first strike and preserving second-strike options.

However, a February 2025 report by the American Physical Society (APS) underscores that defending the US homeland from ICBM attack is fraught with daunting technical and financial challenges.

The report notes that boost-phase intercept is constrained by physics: missiles burn for only three to five minutes, requiring interceptors within 500 kilometers of launch sites, fired almost instantly, or a massive constellation of costly space-based systems-vulnerable to countermeasures like salvo launches .

It also states that midcourse defense is undermined by“threat clouds” of debris and decoys indistinguishable from real warheads in space, with sensors prone to nuclear blackout.

Furthermore, it says that terminal defense offers barely a minute to act, protecting only limited areas. It stresses that modest adversary countermeasures can overwhelm defenses, while arms-race dynamics magnify risks.

The report mentions that US missile defense programs costing over $400 billion since 1957 have yet to produce a proven, reliable homeland defense against ICBMs.