Australia's Missile Wish Dogged By China Deterrence Doubts

According to the strategy, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is being reshaped into an integrated, focused force capable of projecting military power beyond its borders. Long-range ship and land-based missile systems are central to the strategy.

However, Australia's naval and land-based long-range strike capabilities are currently lacking. In December 2024, Australia test-fired the US Tomahawk cruise missile with a 2,500-kilometer range from the HMAS Brisbane destroyer and has announced plans to acquire 200 such missiles.

While the Tomahawk is a formidable weapon, Marcus Hellyer argues in a February 2021 article for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) that it may not achieve its desired deterrent effect, as Australia will not have enough ships to carry the necessary number of missiles to make a difference in a conflict with China.

Hellyer points out that Australia's three Hobart class destroyers have only 48 vertical launch systems (VLS) cells, dwarfed by the 96 aboard the US Arleigh Burke destroyer and the 112 on China's Type 055 cruiser. He notes that the six upcoming Hunter class frigates will only have 32 VLS and won't be ready for service until the 2030s.

In a January 2023 ASPI article , Lesley Seebeck argues that the NSM and current-generation PrSM, both with relatively short ranges of up to 500 kilometers, are short-term fixes better suited for area denial than deterrence.

At the same time, she says relying on long-range missiles for deterrence may not be sustainable at US$3 million for each NSM and $3.5 million per PrSM , and that Australia's defense industry may take up to 10 years to reach sustainable production of such ordnance.

Moreover, Seebeck points out that Australia's calculus about what it could deny versus what it could deter is unclear. She stresses that it is wrong to conflate denial with deterrence, as the former is a military matter, while the latter is political.

She argues Canberra has not given enough thought to identifying which targets to hold at risk to deter a possible adversary, as opposed to what the ADF could deny. In addition, she mentions that whatever Australia could hit that may deter a potential adversary would most likely be located deep in enemy territory.

While Australia operates F-35A stealth fighters that could be used for penetrating long-range strikes, including against China, Harrison Kass mentions in a March 2024 article for The National Interest (TNI) that the F-35A, capable of traveling only 1,600 kilometers, lacks sufficient range for such a role.

To reach the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, Australia's F-35As may depend on tankers vulnerable to China's long-range missiles. Alternatively, it could use forward bases in a partner country like the Philippines, but those bases are within range of most Chinese missiles .

A few Australian F-35As with long-range missiles may only inflict pinprick damage to a country the size of China. Also, considering China's missile arsenal, it could retaliate against Australia much more forcefully than the latter can hit it.

Further, it is doubtful for any Philippine president to authorize offensive strikes by a third party, such as the US or Australia, against China except in the improbable scenario of an attack on its main islands. That is, it is unlikely that any Philippine president would risk turning neighboring China into a long-term adversary by allowing such strikes from its territory.

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In line with that, Marigold Black and Austin Wyatt argue in a March 2023 RAND commentary that Australia's impactful projection doctrine may rest on a flawed assumption due to its oversight of regional neutrality dynamics.

Black and Wyatt argue that Australia's strategy presumes regional acquiescence to its enhanced strike capabilities, yet the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) longstanding neutrality, rooted in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), challenges this assumption.

They say that ASEAN neutrality could undermine Australia's security designs, including by refusing overflight rights and thus undermining its operational reach. For instance, Graham Jenkins says in a 2022 article for the Joint Force Quarterly that Indonesia has taken a hard nationalist position on its airspace, as seen in its refusal to join regional open skies regimes.

As with the Philippines, Jenkins says Indonesia's position on overflight rights may be influenced by its fear of China's retaliation should it allow the US and Australia to use its airspace for military operations.

Further, Black and Wyatt mention that Australia's lack of nuanced engagement with regional partners, exemplified by AUKUS's secrecy, erodes trust. They say this strategic miscalculation risks a“strategic shock” if neutrality disrupts Australia's defense planning, highlighting the need for impactful engagement over power projection.

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