Trump Pulls Out Of WHO And Paris How Did International Bodies Get Through Deglobalisation Last Time Around?

(MENAFN- The Conversation) Following Donald Trump's return to the White House, much attention has been given to his plans for tariffs on imported goods, deportations of illegal migrants , and cuts to federal government spending . Fewer column inches have addressed the implications of his presidency for global regulatory bodies.

Just as he did during his first term, trump has announced the withdrawal of the US from the World health Organization (WHO) and from the Paris climate accords .

And because his tariffs programme will challenge World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, Trump is likely to continue the US policy of stymieing the WTO's appellate body, which adjudicates on trade disputes between states. US withdrawals from other international regulatory bodies are also possible.

Each of the bodies from which Trump withdrew last time around survived. However, threats to global regulatory bodies today could be greater than they were during Trump's first term.

In the US and beyond, deglobalisation has so far been evident only in state policies, and not in trade flows. China, for example, has set up and now dominates several regional investment and trade organisations to provide alternatives to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

However, tariff retaliation and bloc-based regulatory standards could soon turn “slowbalisation” – a trend whereby political support for open trade has gradually weakened and the rate of growth in world trade has slowed – into trade deglobalisation.

We have been here before. The 1930s were characterised by high tariffs, breakup of trade into blocs, and withdrawals and expulsions of major powers from global bodies. In the 1940s, which saw the breakout of the second world war, trade was conducted almost exclusively among allies.

Yet almost all international regulatory bodies survived during this period, albeit they were bruised and were able to achieve less as a result.

Our study , which was published in 2021, distinguished pathways through which three distinct groups of global regulatory bodies either survived or else handed over their archives, networks and organisational capacity to their UN-era successors.

One inter-war group of industry-specific global regulators oversaw capital-intensive and infrastructure-heavy international industries such as telecommunications and railways. This group included the International Telecommunications Union and a modest alphabet soup of closely cooperating railway bodies.

In these fields, interconnection depended on common but frequently updated and adjusted rule sets for technology, accounting and routing management. They also required continuous statistical collections by international bureaus.

Unable to agree major regulatory innovation after the global economic crisis began in 1931, these bodies reduced their focus to managing and maintaining their existing rule sets and information services.

On the outbreak of war in Europe, their bureaus went into a phase of severely reduced activity, with many of their activities suspended. However, they continued to collect and publish statistics, maintained their networks within member states, and developed ambitious plans for peacetime.

The International Telecommunications Union and the railway authorities resumed operations shortly after the end of hostilities with their rule sets intact.

A second cluster were generic bodies, responsible for the oversight of labour relations and aspects of capital flows. These are faster-moving fields than infrastructure-heavy industries. These bodies included the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations (EFO).

They provided expertise for negotiating agreements on particular problems. In the case of the ILO , this included conventions on working time, women's working conditions, and forced labour. The EFO brokered financial support with strict conditions for Austria and Hungary, then new and struggling states which faced acute financial crises in the early 1920s.

These organisations faced increasing difficulties during the deglobalisation of the 1930s. But they continued to provide bilaterally negotiated support for many countries. The ILO, for example, provided technical assistance to some south American governments on the design of social insurance schemes, while the EFO's financial committee worked with central banks.

Survival or bequest was secured by the brokering work of key individual leaders who were able to exploit fluid networks among states, firms and unions in global labour and capital debates.

The EFO secured the transfer of key staff, networks and traditions to post-war bodies including the UN Economic and Social Council and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. And the ILO's director-general, Edward Phelan , was crucial in negotiating with the US to relaunch the organisation with a new programme for the post-war era.

A third group of regulatory bodies was created precisely in response to the 1930s global economic crisis. These were international commodity unions for goods such as tin, rubber, tea and sugar.

Most were publicly run cartels, often backed by the imperial blocs that dominated the fragmenting world trade system. Like many cartels, their cohesion was fragile. But many of those that were successfully established managed to survive the 1930s and the war that followed.

Their survival depended less on the formal administrative organisation of the infrastructure bodies or the individual brokering work that sustained the capital and labour bodies. It was dependent more on their ability to draw upon club-like collective bonds both among major producing and exporting firms and among officials across key producer states and imperial authorities.

Within the tightly bonded International Tin Committee, for example, a succession of agreements on prices, quotas and voting rights were settled. Despite initial US reluctance to see these international commodity unions continue into peacetime, President Harry Truman was persuaded of their temporary value for economic order during reconstruction.

Some even continued until the 1970s, when they collapsed in that decade's global economic turmoil. Freer markets then superseded intergovernmental cartels.

Trump's policies, as well as those of China, Russia and other major powers, may again endanger the roles of global regulatory bodies. But some will survive by focusing on the routine maintenance services provided by their bureaus, and some will empower individual leaders to negotiate their way to reinvention and survival.

Others will pass their capacity to new agencies when deglobalisation eventually abates. And some new international bodies may emerge in response to conditions in industries most adversely affected by the changing terms of trade.

Our work has led us to conclude that which strategy is chosen depends on two things. First, on the features of the field being regulated. And second on the informal social organisation within the international bodies and member states, which shapes how people can act and the skills they can sustain.

It remains to be seen how informal social organisation in the WHO and climate treaty system will now evolve after US withdrawal.

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