US, EU Sanctions Aren't Working In Myanmar

Evidence of this coordination emerged on December 10, 2021 , coinciding with Human Rights Day , with the US rolling out a package of measures in conjunction with the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union.

For example, the EU's“restrictive measures” – the bloc's parlance for economic sanctions – include many of the same sanctions imposed by the US, such as restrictions on the export of military and dual-use equipment, asset freezes, visa and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the export of telecommunications equipment.

The US has also imposed targeted sanctions via the Specially Designated Nationals list , a blacklist of people with whom US citizens and firms are banned from doing business. Listed entities in Myanmar include military leaders, business people and their families.

The idea is to focus the economic pain on individuals and entities involved in the coup and subsequent repression of democracy campaigners, rather than on the country as a whole.

Certainly, history suggests that the US needed to update its sanctions policy.

Myanmar observers have long debated the effectiveness of the old Myanmar sanctions regime, with many concluding that it had little impact on the junta's decision to return to democracy. Rather, Myanmar's democratic elections were part of the military's road map and not the result of sanctions pressure.

One reason for this skepticism over earlier sanctions was that they targeted imports from key sectors of Myanmar's economy, such as garments and textiles , that were not connected to the junta. These economic sanctions harmed private enterprises in Myanmar.

The latest sanctions target military-owned or -linked enterprises , such as Myanma Economic Holdings Public Company, Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited, Myanma Gems Enterprise, Myanma Timber Enterprise and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise.

The post-2021 sanctions, though, are still plagued by some of the same problems of their predecessors.

They lack the weight of the United Nations, which has not called for sanctions against Myanmar. This stands in contrast to sanctions against other countries flouting international norms, like North Korea and Iran .

The UN Security Council is unlikely to sanction Myanmar as permanent members China and Russia refuse to condemn , let alone sanction, Myanmar's military rulers.

As a result, the international community has been split in its response to Myanmar's democratic backsliding and human rights violations . While Western countries have decided to isolate Myanmar through targeted trade and financial sanctions, countries in East and Southeast Asia have maintained diplomatic and trade ties with the military government.

And there is an incentive for countries in Southeast Asia to not take part in any sanction regime. As we show in our forthcoming book,“Trading with Pariahs ,” Myanmar's trade ties tend to be strongest within its region.

During the first sanctions regime from 1988 to 2015, Southeast Asian economic ties with Myanmar became stronger as the country's trade with sanctions-imposing Western states declined.

For countries in East and Southeast Asia, maintaining ties with Myanmar provided not only economic opportunities but also a strategy for monitoring and perhaps ameliorating Myanmar's internal situation.

For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, admitted Myanmar in 1997 despite the refusal of the junta to allow democratic elections and address human rights abuses. The approach favored by Myanmar's neighbors was to try and bring Myanmar's generals in from the cold rather than ostracizing them internationally.

And despite Singapore's recent declaration that it will stop arms transfers to Myanmar , ASEAN member countries and those in East Asia continue to refrain from sanctioning Myanmar, preferring engagement to isolation.

While US sanctions have the potential to hurt the military, there are reasons to believe that they won't be able to bring the government to its knees. It is likely that the uneven termination of the United States' earlier sanctions provided insufficient time for American firms to fully engage and invest in Myanmar's market, limiting the potential for future leverage now.

Those countries that do have significant leverage are unlikely to sanction Myanmar. And this undermines efforts by the US or the West to isolate the country.

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The challenge for the West can be seen in its sanctions on jet fuel trade. Amnesty International's“Deadly Cargo” report in 2023 highlighted how Myanmar's military can still secure reliable shipments of jet fuel despite the US sanctions on the product.

The reason is more than 95% of Myanmar's refined petroleum oils – needed for jet fuel – come from regional trading partners. Since 2021, China, Thailand, Singapore and Russia have provided much of the Myanmar's military's jet fuel , enabling it to continue bombing campaigns throughout the country.

Even though the US Treasury has expanded its sanctions on jet fuel to include both military and commercial, the impact of these sector-wide sanctions remains unclear.

While the nature of the current US sanctions is starkly different from prior efforts to pressure Myanmar's generals, the effectiveness and potential for success appear quite similar.

Given the dearth of economic ties between Myanmar and countries outside its region, the potential for change in Myanmar seems unlikely without significant efforts by those countries with the ability to weaponize their extensive economic interdependence: China, Japan and ASEAN member states.

ASEAN is not blind to the erosion of human rights, and it has signaled its awareness of the regime's atrocities and support for civilians by denying Myanmar its turn as ASEAN's chair in 2026 .

However, the regional bloc is unlikely to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in the foreseeable future, casting further doubt on the ability of Western sanctions to improve human rights and democracy meaningfully.

Charmaine Willis is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Skidmore College and Keith A Preble is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

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