The Error Of Nato's Ways In Asia

In his meeting with Kishida, Stoltenberg noted his
concern
about“China's heavy military build-up” and“the modernization and expansion of its nuclear forces.” This must have been music to Kishida's ears, for he has persistently strived to develop closer relations with NATO for precisely this reason.

But it is difficult to see how European security would benefit from an enlarged NATO military role in East Asia, which is certain to antagonize Beijing. Unsurprisingly, China has responded vociferously to NATO's words and actions.

China fears that the United States' largely unconnected alliances in the region will take on a more integrated and anti-Chinese character under the NATO umbrella. NATO has countered that its military presence is benign and defensive in nature.

NATO's allegedly defensive intentions are unlikely to reassure Beijing. Virtually all international relations experts agree that it is impossible to correctly decipher other states' intentions.

Without certainty of others' intentions, states tend to raise their guard and take countermeasures. One does not have to be an international relations expert to predict that this could well happen in East Asia should NATO increase its military presence there.

NATO members often complain about Chinese attempts at changing the staquo, but they seem unable or unwilling to recognize that their own venture into East Asia constitutes a change of the staquo - something Beijing would feel compelled to respond to.

This dynamic of tit-for-tat escalation in the absence of certainty used to be common knowledge in the international relations community. It is often called the
security dilemma .

If Chinese leaders perceive NATO engagement with East Asian countries as increasing the threat to China, they might also take precautions by increasing armaments and alliance building. One counterproductive effect on European security, for example, would arise if China moved even closer to Russia.

But after
russia's invasion of ukraine , warnings about security dilemmas have often been dismissed as appeasement. If we accept the security dilemma logic, hawks contend, would we not also have to accept Russian President Vladimir Putin's excuse that NATO enlargement forced him to invade Ukraine?

The answer is no. It is of course true that Russia's invasion is illegal and unjustified. But it is also true that Moscow perceived NATO enlargement as threatening, although each new NATO member had purely defensive reasons for joining the alliance. Until recently, the latter point was not seen as a crazy appeasement argument.

Wars stir emotions. The Ukraine war has made Europeans blind to the dangerconsequences of geographically expanded engagement. While NATO's enlargement in Eastern Europe was tightly connected to European security, deepened engagement in East Asia has zero rhyme or reason. It will only serve to antagonize China.

Despite China's often problematic behavior, it does not pose a direct threat to Europe. In 2020, this was
recognized
even by the European Union foreign affairs chief. But such realism is hard to come by in post-invasion Europe. NATO's East Asian ambitions unnecessarily risk turning China into an enemy of Europe.

When NATO strays so far“out of area” that it begins operating in East Asia, one has to question the benefits for European security. There seem to be few, if any. For the United States, NATO's turn to East Asia is strategically significant.

Washington is seeking to maintainglobal hegemony by binding together its loose alliance networks into a firmer coalition capable of containing a rising China. It seems clear that NATO's new East Asia policy is primarily directed from Washington.

But Europe does not have to play the United States' power games. As French President Macron correctly stated earlier in 2023, getting involved in such games would be“a trap for Europe.”

Ulv Hanssen is Associate Professor at Soka University.

LiHagstrom is Professor of Political Science and Deputy Head of the Department of Political Science at Law at the Swedish Defence University.

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.