US Diverts JASSM-ER Missiles To Iran, Risking Deterrence Vs China

At the same time, the reallocation of JASSM-ER stocks, a standoff weapon designed to penetrate defended airspace, could imply that Iran's air defenses remain a substantial threat, despite American claims to the contrary.

In March 2026, the Wall Street Journal reported that 85% of Iran's air defense systems and radars have been neutralized, with 100 anti-aircraft batteries and 120 radars destroyed, citing Israeli military sources.

However, the New York Times reported this month that multiple shoot-downs of US aircraft, specifically those of an F-15E and an A-10, are proof that, despite being substantially degraded, Iran's air defenses are still a threat to US operations.

Citing US intelligence reports, the NYT notes that Iran has maintained much of its capabilities underground, which could have saved some systems from US and Israeli airstrikes, and that even if underground bunkers and silos could appear to be damaged, Iran has been able to dig out the launchers and fire them again quickly.

Despite these operational demands, the cost of sustaining such air strikes is becoming increasingly evident. More than five weeks into the Iran war, the US may be staring down a shortage of long-range standoff munitions, forcing a reliance on less-capable alternatives.

In a March 2026 press briefing, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, stated that the use of such munitions - specifically the Tomahawk cruise missile - may need to be replaced with less sophisticated munitions such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.

Both have significantly shorter ranges than the JASSM-ER. Highlighting the possible JASSM-ER expenditure rates during intensified air strikes against Iran, Macdonald Amoah and other authors mention in a March 2026 Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) article, citing data from the Payne Institute, that in the first 96 hours of Operation Epic Fury, the US launched 135 JASSM/JASSM-ER missiles. That rate could exponentially increase should the US opt to intensify operations over Iran, as Trump has threatened.

In their analysis, Amoah and others note that the pace of operations is consuming munitions faster than they can be replenished, particularly long-range strike systems such as the JASSM-ER. They highlight a gap in US industrial resilience, particularly in sourcing minerals and materials essential for manufacturing more munitions and weapon systems.

This imbalance between consumption and replenishment reflects deeper structural constraints. Seth Jones's January 2023 Center for Strategic and International Studies report highlights gaps in US military resilience, noting that the defense industrial base operates at a peacetime pace with limited surge capacity, risking rapid depletion of stockpiles during major conflicts.

He emphasizes the industry's risk-averse nature, reliance on multi-year contracts and 12–24-month lead times for critical components, which delay output. Jones also criticizes outdated acquisition regulations and sluggish funding processes that hinder responsiveness, as well as wartime logistical challenges that complicate replenishment and distribution.