America's Venezuelan Adventure Has Limited Impact On Asia

The US and China each claims entitlement to a sphere of influence while refusing to accept the other's claimed sphere of influence. In 2014 Xi Jinping famously said,“It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” US alliances, military bases, and security cooperation in China's neighborhood are an affront to that vision.

Conversely, China is seeking naval bases among the Pacific island states, recently surprised Australia with military exercises in the Tasman Sea – and, until now, had a strong economic and political relationship with the Venezuelan government in America's backyard.

Many analysts argue that the abduction of Maduro and his wife was a violation of international law. It follows, arguably, that this act by the world's most influential country, historically a major proponent of a“rules based” international order, gives a green light to countries such as Russia and China to flout global rules and norms in pursuit of their own interests. If so, Taiwan might be in even greater danger than before.

This argument overlooks the historical fact that Washington's behavior in this case does not set a new precedent. The US carried out multiple military interventions in Central and South America during the previous century.

Moreover, this argument relies on the assumption that, prior to the snatching of Maduro, Russia and China were at least partly restrained from taking aggressive actions by international law. If there was any truth in that assumption, it's difficult to see.

Russia invaded Ukraine, a sovereign state, in 2022, and since then has murdered civilians, mistreated prisoners of war and kidnapped Ukrainian children.

A court authorized by the United Nations specifically disavowed China's territorial claims in the South China Sea in 2016 based on principles laid out in an international treaty to which Beijing is a signatory. The Chinese government rejected the court's decision on the grounds that China's claims supersede international law. Instead, Beijing has pushed its invalidated claims by ramming, looting, and water-cannoning the vessels of other claimants.

Any restraint exercised by China seems the result of Beijing's desire to avoid alienating all of the Southeast Asian governments and provoking direct military intervention by the US.

China's imposition of a National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 violated the 1984 Sino-British joint declaration, an international treaty registered with the United Nations. Beijing promised to maintain Hong Kong's political system after the 1997 handover. Instead, China has dismantled civil liberties in Hong Kong, highlighted by the December conviction of pro-democracy publisher Jimmy Lai.

The post-handover argument that China would keep its commitment because of concern for its international reputation has collapsed.

Similarly, while Beijing has used lawfare as a tactic to support its agenda (such as the campaign to sell the bogus idea that UN Resolution 2758 requires all UN member countries at accept that Taiwan is part of the PRC), international law has done little or nothing to restrain the PRC's own policy toward Taiwan.

China continues to threaten force against Taiwan and to carry out military harassment, cyberattacks, destruction of infrastructure, and economic coercion. Furthermore, Beijing argues that any potential war between the PRC and Taiwan is a domestic Chinese issue, not governed by international law.

In short, Moscow and Beijing have been doing what they wanted without waiting for the US to de-legitimize the rules of gentlemanly behavior in international politics.

Some analysts believe Trump's demonstrated willingness to take decisive action will intimidate China, deterring it from moving militarily against Taiwan.

Alas, this is probably incorrect. The Venezuela operation shows, as did the bombing of Iran in June 2025 and the missile strikes against Syria during his first term, that Trump is willing to take sharp but limited military action against weak opponents. A major war against China, however, would be a completely different matter.

Trump has repeatedly expressed reticence about sending US forces to defend Taiwan. On top of this, the Trump Administration hopes to achieve a bilateral trade deal with China in 2026, giving Washington an incentive to avoid antagonizing Beijing over Taiwan.