(MENAFN- Asia Times)
This article was first published by Pacific Forum . It is republished here with permission.
The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis.
Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation's strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication : warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers.
Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail.
South Korea's evolving perception of strategic simultaneity
US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington's 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated“integrated deterrence,” pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies.
Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools.
Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces.
The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning.
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