When Trump And Albanese Talk Defense

But such concerns are not exclusive to Australia. Rather, they speak to Trump's broader approach to alliances worldwide – he wants US allies in Europe and Asia to share more of the burden, as well.

Trump's team sees defense spending (calculated as a percentage of GDP) as a basic indicator of an ally's seriousness about both their own national defense and collective security with Washington.

As Hegseth noted in testimony before Congress this week,“we can't want [our allies'] security more than they do.”

Initially, the Trump administration's burden-sharing grievances with NATO received the most attention. The government demanded European allies boost spending to 5% of GDP in the interests of what prominent MAGA figures have called“burden-owning .”

Several analysts interpreted these demands as indicative of what will be asked of Asian partners, including Australia. In reality, what Washington wants from European and Indo-Pacific allies differs in small but important ways.

In Europe, the Trump administration wants allies to assume near-total responsibility for their own defense to enable the US to focus on bigger strategic priorities . These include border security at home and, importantly, Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific.

By contrast, Trump's early moves on defense policy in Asia have emphasized a degree of cooperation and mutual benefit.

The administration has explicitly linked its burden-sharing demands with a willingness to work with its allies – Japan, South Korea, Australia and others – in pursuit of a strategy of collective defense to deter Chinese aggression.

This reflects a long-standing recognition in Washington that America needs its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific perhaps more than anywhere else in the world. The reason: to support US forces across the vast Pacific and Indian oceans and to counter China's growing ability to disrupt US military operations across the region.

In other words, the US must balance its demands of Indo-Pacific allies with the knowledge that it also needs their help to succeed in Asia. This means the Albanese government can and should engage the Trump administration with confidence on defense matters – including AUKUS.

It has a lot to offer America, not just a lot to lose.

But a discussion over Australia's defense spending is not simply a matter of alliance management. It also speaks to the genuine challenges Australia faces in matching its strategy with its resources.

Albanese is right to say Australia will set its own defense policy based on its needs rather than an arbitrary percentage of GDP determined by Washington.

But it's also true Australia's defense budget must match the aspirations and requirements set out in its 2024 National Defense Strategy . This is necessary for our defence posture to be credible.

This document paints a sobering picture of the increasingly fraught strategic environment Australia finds itself in. And it outlines an ambitious capability development agenda to allow Australia to do its part to maintain the balance of power in the region, alongside the United States and other partners.

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But there is growing concern in the Australian policy community that our defence budget is insufficient to meet these goals.

For instance, one of the lead authors of Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Sir Angus Houston, mused last year that in order for AUKUS submarines to be a“net addition” to the nation's military capability, Australia would need to increase its defence spending to more than 3% of GDP through the 2030s.

Otherwise, he warned, AUKUS would“cannibalize” investments in Australia's surface fleet, long-range strike capabilities, air and missile defence, and other capabilities.

There's evidence the Australian government understands this, too. Marles and the minister for defense industry, Pat Conroy , have both said the government is willing to“have a conversation” about increasing spending, if required to meet Australia's strategic needs.

This is all to say that an additional push from Trump on defense spending and burden-sharing – however unpleasantly delivered – would not be out of the ordinary. And it may, in fact, be beneficial for Australia's own deliberations on its defense spending needs.

Thomas Corben is research fellow, foreign policy and defense, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

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