Recommitting To Japan-South Korea Cooperation Amid Uncertainty

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For years, the World Trade Organization has been stalled by disagreements among developed and developing countries and challenged by the practices of China's state-led economic system. Now, the trade system is under immense strain as the United States imposes unilateral tariffs that undermine the“most favored nation” principle, and escalating trade war looms as a possibility.

Japan and South Korea share an interest in stabilizing the existing economic order, maintaining relatively free flow of goods and services and strengthening their own economic security and national resilience.

US ally problem: Disruption trumps stability

Moreover, Japan and South Korea must deal with a mutual US ally that is increasingly a source of disruption rather than stability.

Both countries run significant trade surpluses with the US, which has made them top targets for tariffs. Japan and South Korea currently face reciprocal tariffs of 24% and 25% respectively, as well as Section 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, steel, and aluminum. Japanese and Korean companies are being asked to invest more in the US.

The two governments are also facing US pressure to boost their defense spending and host nation support and to increase other kinds of alliance burden-sharing at the same time as the US is considering reducing its military presence .

In general, the return of an“America First” approach to US foreign policy throws traditional alliances and institutions into question, leaving Japan and South Korea in a more vulnerable position.

How can Japan and South Korea work together to address these challenges?

The first step is to maintain the positive progress that has been achieved over the last two years mechanisms have been established, and plans have been set in motion to start addressing many of the common concerns mentioned previously. Some initiatives will need to be reexamined under new national leadership, but they constitute an important baseline that should not be lost.

Although the Trump administration has reaffirmed support for trilateral US-Japan-South Korea cooperation so far, Tokyo and Soul may need to push forward bilaterally without Washington in some cases.

Second, Japan and South Korea may benefit from consulting with one another regarding their respective bilateral negotiations with the US on trade and security issues. In some cases, they may even find creative ways to coordinate their efforts.

For example, SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won recently proposed that South Korea and Japan could respond to US pressure by jointly purchasing liquefied natural gas from the US,“to increase deal size and leverage greater buying power to secure lower prices.”

This type of approach could be applied in other areas. Tokyo and Seoul could also quietly consult on their respective bottom lines, to avoid one government taking a“bad” deal with the US that sets a negative precedent for the other.

Third, Japan and South Korea can build upon the foundation of the last two years to cultivate more widespread support for improving bilateral ties among their domestic stakeholders including legislators, civil society organizations, scholars and the general public.

There have already been modest improvements in the two countries' public sentiment toward each other, and now is the time to build on this momentum. The more stakeholders who see Japan-South Korea ties as valuable, the more resilient their relationship will be to negative episodes in the future.

There are also likely to be opportunities to build ties in the trilateral context; for example, the US House of Representatives recently introduced bipartisan legislation to establish an inter-parliamentary dialogue among elected politicians in the US, Japan and South Korea.

Fourth, Japan and South Korea will benefit from embedding their bilateral cooperation in broader regional and international coalitions.

Most of the problems that these two countries face cannot be solved through bilateral cooperation alone; instead, Tokyo and Seoul must partner with other governments in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and elsewhere to address transnational security and economic challenges.