New World Order: Art Of The Deal Vs Art Of War

China, by contrast, frames its initiatives within the language of shared prosperity . The“Community of Shared Future” narrative seeks to rebrand Chinese power as global stewardship, even as Belt and Road projects face increasing scrutiny over debt risks.

The tariffs have had clear domestic impacts. In the US, manufacturing hubs nearshored supply chains to Mexico and Southeast Asia. Mexico's auto sector annual growth is 2.7–4.8%. Yet inflation soared .

Before Trump's 2025 escalations, tariffs already cost US consumers US$1.4 billion per month, though more recent estimates for 2025 suggest even higher costs, with one source projecting a $3.1 trillion expense over a decade (about $2,100 per household in 2025).

In China, RCEP has strengthened regional ties and shielded key industries. Semiconductor independence has advanced. By 2023, Chinese firms achieved 14nm chip mass production. However, BRI-linked debt crises and continued brain drain into US and EU tech ecosystems expose vulnerabilities.

Recent weeks brought fresh escalations. Trump's new tariffs target not just consumer goods but critical Chinese industrial components, raising costs for American manufacturers. China's counter-tariffs now hit US goods with 125% duties.

Yet, China's government maintains a 5% economic growth target, signaling confidence through stimulus, infrastructure expansion and diversified export markets.

Interestingly, China has quietly exempted certain US semiconductors from retaliation, which can be viewed as an asymmetric gesture. While Trump boasts of“new negotiations,” Beijing publicly denies any formal talks are underway. This diplomatic ambiguity mirrors Sun Tzu's advice:“Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak.”

Meanwhile, trade systems are fragmenting . The US champions the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to set new digital norms. China uses RCEP and BRICS channels to dilute Western regulatory hegemony. Currency systems follow a similar arc. The m-CBDC Bridge, involving China, Thailand and the UAE, pilots cross-border digital payments independent of SWIFT.

At the same time, technological decoupling deepens. The US CHIPS and Science Act invests $52 billion in US semiconductor revival. Meanwhile, China's“Little Giants” program nurtures over 10,000 tech SMEs, building an ecosystem less reliant on Western imports.

Middle and small powers are adapting to the new world order. Canada and Australia supply critical minerals to both blocs. India pursues non-aligned tech development, investing in RISC-V open-source hardware. Singapore advances digital neutrality through initiatives like TradeTrust blockchain.

Taiwan leans into silicon deterrence , with TSMC's 2nm chip dominance making it indispensable but also increasingly vulnerable. Flexibility, not loyalty, defines the survival strategy of middle powers in this bifurcating world.

Two futures remain plausible. Competitive coexistence would see limited de-escalation. The US and China could find collaboration niches in climate tech, AI governance and pandemic response. Yet Cold War 2.0 looms as a darker path, with potential complete tech and financial decoupling , SWIFT-CIPS fracture and rival digital infrastructures.

Black swans lurk. GPT-7-level AI weaponization, ungoverned, could destabilize financial and political systems. Competition over green tech supremacy, between America's Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) incentives and China's Green Belt projects, may trigger new conflict vectors.

The US must modernize multilateral systems. A WTO 2.0 featuring digital trade and AI dispute resolution protocols is critical. Simultaneously, crisis communication channels with China's PLA are urgent to prevent algorithm-driven escalation.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

China must also rethink its Belt and Road model. Debt relief , particularly linked to climate vulnerabilities, could rebuild diplomatic goodwill. A narrative shift from“global leadership” to“cooperative gradualism” would also soften resistance.

Third powers should seize agency. ASEAN must finalize a South China Sea Code of Conduct to avoid conflict with China. The EU needs to operationalize its 100 billion euro Tech Sovereignty Fund before strategic dependency hardens.

Endurance over dominance

The contest between the“Art of the Deal” and the“Art of War” is shaping a new world order. Trump's vision is one of disruption and swift gains. China's is of structure, patience and adaptation.

Yet, in this new reality, dominance may matter less than resilience. Adaptability-not size-could define success. Nations like Singapore and the UAE, fluent in dual engagement, already show how neutrality and strategic agility are forms of power.

As Sun Tzu teaches,“In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.” And as Trump reminds,“If you're going to be thinking, you may as well think big.”

The gameboard has changed. The next winners will be those who master the arts of both the deal and war.

Tang Meng Kit is a graduate of the MSc in International Relations program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His research interests encompass cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese politics and policy issues, as well as aerospace technology. He currently works as an aerospace engineer.

Sign up here to comment on Asia Times stories Or Sign in to an existing accoun

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

• Click to share on X (Opens in new window) X
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window) LinkedIn
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook
• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window) WhatsApp
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
• Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
• Click to print (Opens in new window) Print