Jet By Jet, US Losing Pacific Air Superiority Over China

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In terms of long-range air-to-air missiles, Tyler Rogoway mentions in a December 2023 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that China's new PL-17 is most likely a very long-range air-to-air missile with an estimated 300-kilometer range.

Rogoway notes that the PL-17 may be intended against airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, other aircraft close to the target, ground-based radar or satellites. He mentions that the size of the PL-17 may restrict it to being carried externally by China's J-16 or J-20 fighters.

As for China's rapid airpower growth, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation comprise the Indo-Pacific's largest air force, with 3,150 aircraft-1,900 of them fighters-an increase of 400 in the last three years, per Aquilino .

Aquilino warns that if trends persist, China could soon overtake the US in total airpower , complementing its dominance on land and sea.

Given China's looming quantitative fighter advantage, Matthew Revels mentions in an April 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that in an invasion of Taiwan, the PLA would likely mass air assets over the self-governing island to achieve localized, tactical air superiority instead of fighting to achieve strategic air dominance.

Beyond sheer fighter numbers, China's missile capabilities pose an even greater threat to US air operations in the region.

Eamon Passey mentions in a December 2024 article for the American Foreign Policy Council that when it comes to conventional missiles, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has a significant hardware advantage over the US.

Passey notes China has developed an extensive array of ballistic and cruise missiles that are oftentimes more numerous and sophisticated than their US counterparts. He says that while the US invests in hypersonic weapons technology, it lags behind China in development and deployment due to high costs and the complexity of integrating those weapons into its military framework.

Passey observes that China can make substantial investments in its missile capabilities mainly due to the absence of constraining arms control treaties. He also points out that the PLARF manages an autonomous, intensely focused and extensive missile program that has quickly developed to unite nuclear and conventional capabilities under a single command structure.

The PLARF is critical in China's counter-intervention strategy in regional conflicts. Christopher Mihal mentions in a 2021 Military Review article that China, as of that year, has 2,200 conventional ballistic missiles and enough anti-ship missiles to attack every US surface combatant in the South China Sea, with sufficient firepower to overcome each ship's missile defenses.

Further, Kelly Grieco and other writers mention in a December 2024 Stimson Center report that the PLARF is expected to play a leading role in neutralizing US airbases in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific locations, launching coordinated missile attacks to destroy US aircraft on the ground and cratering runways to make them unusable.

These missile capabilities threaten the US's forward-deployed airpower, which remains highly vulnerable due to inadequate base fortifications, Greico writes.

Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that in a worst-case scenario, most US aircraft losses will occur on the ground, as its Pacific airbases lack hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) and individual aircraft shelters (IAS).