Campaign Over, Trump Must Make Real-World Foreign Policy Choices

The second reason is that America remains the world's largest economy but is also a country with global economic and security interests and exposures. This reality makes“America First” a much harder idea to implement than it might have sounded on the campaign trail. While many people fear an American reversion to the sort of isolationism and detachment that was seen during the 1930s, the breadth and depth of America's global security and business interests make this a remote prospect.

Look just at Elon Musk, the billionaire who backed Trump's campaign most conspicuously and who since the election has stuck close to his side: Musk's electric vehicle business, Tesla, builds cars and components in factories in Germany, the Netherlands, Canada and China as well as the United States; his Starlink satellite-based internet business is global, and his SpaceX business has customers worldwide too; all depend on global supply chains for their manufacturing.“America First” means little to him, and could even pose a threat to his businesses.

The campaigning and the promises are therefore riven with contradictions. Most relevant to foreign affairs is the contradiction between Trump's loud demands that America's allies in NATO in Europe and in bilateral security alliances in Asia should contribute more in terms of defense spending and military capabilities, and his declarations, also, that he plans to impose high tariffs on American imports from Japan, Europe and elsewhere. This would make it harder for those allies to contribute more and would raise America's own defense procurement costs since it depends for Europe and others for many key supplies.

Another contradiction, which is related to that threatened trade war on America's own allies, is that Trump campaigned hard on the idea that he would seek“peace through strength,” by building up America's own defense spending and by confronting China in every way necessary – and yet his plans threaten to reduce that very strength by eroding America's alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

The American defense industry does not have sufficient production capacity to supply current US military needs, let alone a defense expansion or a conflict with China: It depends crucially on co-production with allies and partners, notably including Japan and South Korea.

America's China strategy, even in the minds of Republican Party strategists, has long depended on persuading countries in the region around China to at least stay neutral or ideally to lean towards America. Slapping high tariffs on goods from India, Vietnam, the Philippines and other“strategic partners,” in the preferred diplomatic jargon, is hardly the best way to seduce them.

Much therefore depends on how these contradictions are resolved and what America First truly comes to mean. An immediate question concerns Trump's campaign pledge to“end” Russia's war in Ukraine by negotiating a peace: if he makes a serious attempt at doing that, he will also have to take account of Russia's strategic partnership with China and of Russia's use in the conflict of soldiers and munitions from North Korea. Beyond that important question, however, he and his national security team will have to work out how they can stand up to China while simultaneously engaging in trade wars.

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In the case of Japan, there may be some room for compromise given that even the most zealous of America Firsters cannot deny the importance to the anti-China strategy of US military bases in Japan and Japan's own defense build-up. But for many countries that lack such close ties to the US, moves in recent years to join China-led groupings such as the BRICS will look to have been a prudent hedging of bets.

There is no room to doubt that the Trump administration will be at least as tough in its competition with China as the Biden team has been. The contradictions concern the potential effectiveness of that policy, not its direction. The Trump administration will demand more from Taiwan in return for its support and protection, but will not knowingly seek to open the doors to a Chinese takeover. Given Trump's past dialogue with North Korea's Kim Jong Un, we can expect him again to try to hold personal talks with Kim, though the North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia will likely delay any such initiative.

The re-election of Donald Trump spells the end, for now, of the old form of American leadership. With the world's largest economy and military force, and with interests all around the globe, America will still, however, remain a leader. What we have yet to discover is where that new form of leadership is going to take us and how sustainable it will be.

Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist,
Bill Emmott
is currently chairman of the
Japan Society of the UK , the
International Institute for Strategic Studies
and the
International Trade Institute .

This article first published on Bill Emmott's Global View is the English original of a November 17 article published in Japanese by the Mainichi Shimbun. It is republished with permission.

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