China's New Spy Post In Cuba Poses Nuclear Risks

It also says that China's Cuba SIGINT facilities could have a direction-finding apparaknown as an“elephant cage” or“wullenweber,” which are giant antennas with 360 elements in a circle.

It notes that such a device can track maritime activity, with Cuba strategically located to pick up signals along theEast Coast and triangulate the location ofnuclear submarines in conjunction with China's similar facilities worldwide.

The initialresponse to reports of the new Chinese facility has been a mixture of contradiction and denial. In a June 2023 Politarticle , Alexander Ward points out that the White House and Pentagon initially called the reports“inaccurate”, but later clarified that the Chinese base in Cuba had already been established. Ward also mentioned that the Chinese spying effort is an ongoing concern and that thehas taken steps to deal with it.

He mentions that China upgraded its intelligence collection facilities in Cuba in 2019, which is well-documented in the intelligence record. Ward also said thatPresident Joe Biden directed his administration to address the issue within months, noting that the thrust of the engagement with Beijing over the spy post has been through diplomacy.

However, Ward mentions that Representative Mike Turner, chair of the House Intelligence Committee, criticized the Biden administration for contradicting themselves multiple times about whether or not the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is spying on thefrom Cuba.

He also stated that Representative Mike Gallagher, chair of the House China Committee, slammed the Biden administration's response to the initial reports. Moreover, he says Representative Ritchie Torres, a member of the same panel, said the news of the base is“sufficiently plausible to merit congressional oversight.”

The two leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee released a joint statement in response to the news, stating that it would be unacceptable for China to establish an intelligence facility within 100 miles of Florida.

Aside from its purported spy base in Cuba, China may operate similar facilities in the Indian Ocean and adjacent to the South China Sea. In April 2023, Asia Times reported on China's possible spy facilities on Myanmar's Great CIsland and at Cambodia's Ream Naval Base.

Satellite imagery from US-based Maxar Technologies has revealed that construction work has resumed on Myanmar's Great CIsland. The images show that a 2,300-meter runway has been extended, leading to suspicions that China may be responsible for the development.

It is believed that China is aiming to use CIsland as a listening post in the Indian Ocean, giving it a strategic advantage over the Indian Navy in information gathering and positioning.

Reports indicate CIsland could also serve as a possible forward defensive position for the Beijing-financed Kyaukpyu Port, the maritime termiof the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which reaches from China's southern Yunnan province to the Indian Ocean.

Around the same time, the Cambodian government announced China-funded plans to build an air defense center and expand a radar system near the Ream Naval Base.

The Cambodian government has denied persistent allegations and reports suggest that the base is being upgraded into a Chinese spy hub for the South China Sea. If so, it would be its first overseas base in the Indo-Pacific region.

China's SIGINT facilities in Cuba and possibly Myanmar and Cambodia may add to its growing array of submarine detection technologies, significantly improving its strategic deterrence vis-à-vis the US.

Asia Times has previously reported on China's use of terahertz technology and extremely low frequency (ELF) signal detection to tracknuclear submarines. Advances in sensor resolution, processing power and machine autonomy have expanded the range of detectable signals, enabling the distinction of previously indistinguishable signals.

Commercial and open-source technologies like satellite imagery, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and social media tracking enhance the ability to identify submarine fleets, track submarine developments and discern patrol patterns.

Such technologies add to the growing transparency of the world's oceans, which can revealcovert operations to shadow China and Russia's nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) using inuclear attack submarines, which can lead to nuclear retaliation from the latter if their underwater nuclear deterrents are perceived to be under threat.

Such developments can also threatenextended deterrence guarantees to crucial allies such as South Korea and Japan, as near-peer submarine detection capabilities can undermine the security ofSSBNs.

That can potentially erode confidence in America's second-strike nuclear capabilities, making it reluctant to assist its allies without the safety of its nuclear umbrella and adding incentive for the latter to develop nuclear arsenals of their own.