Climate Change And A New Great Game In Africa

Belatedly, the French government has taken notice. During a tour of four Francophone African states in March, French President Emmanuel Macron promised that Paris would no longer seek to interfere in Africa in pursuit of its own strategic interests, claiming
the era of“Francafrique” was over .

Macron wasn't the first to make such promises, and perhaps therein lies a problem: African leaders and citizens have heard similar pledges before. But in places like Gabon, the role of the French state in propping up Bongo was growing more and more unpopular. Changes in rhetoric haven't been followed by changes in practice, and France has continued to treat Francophone Africa as its own back yard.

French doublespeak has created opportunities for others, and not only coup leaders. Instability across the wide belt of Francophone Africa has opened the door for Russia to renew its own influence on the continent. For instance, when French forces left Mali, it was Russian-led Wagner troops who took over.

While the Soviet Union long played a role in Africa, Russia has only sought to renew its engagement on the continent in the past decade. The war in Ukraine accelerated these efforts. Now, with its global influence challenged, Russia is seeking to establish control over strategic raw materials and to build a block to counter what it sees as Western dominance of international organizations.

Two trips within nine months by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov included formal meetings in 11 African countries.

One attraction of Moscow for African governments is Russia's willingness to provide military and other forms of assistance with a promise not to interfere in internal politics or, as China has been accused of, to create debt traps that can be traded for increased control over vital assets. Russian support appears to come with fewer strings (though whether ceding control over key export sectors might be a trap of another kind remains to be seen).

Russia's legacy in Africa is different from that of former colonial powers. During the Soviet era, Moscow was the main critic of empires in forums like the United Nations; it provided armed and other support to freedom fighters in struggles against colonial powers, including in the
fight against apartheid in South Africa .

President Vladimir Putin may see Africa through the lens of Russian interests, and the memory of Russian (and Soviet) solidarity across Africa has made it easier to execute his agenda. Immediately after the recent coup in Niger, for instance,
tailors couldn't keep pace with demand
for Russian flags waved by supporters.

In the 19th century, the struggle for power in Central Asia between Britain and Russia was described as a“Great Game.” So is the power struggle between France and Russia in Africa a transposing of that contest? As France's influence wanes, Russia has rushed to capitalize.

But to view current events only as the result of external politics is to miss important underlying issues. Place a map of the Sahel belt over a political map of Africa, and the alignment becomes clear: Ecological disaster, drought, desertification, and resultant conflicts over land and resources have fed national and regional conflicts more than competition between foreign powers.

Simply put, the underlying causes of instability and insecurity are the internal, regional tensions created by a precariecological zone. The increased impact of the climate emergency will further stress regional stability.

To see the region's crises as a renewal of the Great Game alone is to fail to note the impact of a worsening climate and the social and economic instability it creates. A new Great Game may continue, but the success of France or Russia won't resolve the challenges that citizens of these countries face.

For them, political uncertainty is anything but a game.

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