(MENAFN- Asia Times) America's policy of“strategic ambiguity” is giving way to a policy of limited“strategic clarity.” However, the whittling away of strategic ambiguity can only go so far without risking the hallmark of US Taiwan policy,“dual deterrence,” which is the main pillar of upholding the“status quo.”
Dual deterrence and maintenance of the status quo are designed to prevent the People's Republic of China (PRC) from attacking Taiwan and Taiwan from declaring independence. Both have served America's Asia policy well and have passed the test of time since being built into in the 1950s by president Dwight Eisenhower and secretary of state John Foster Dulles.
Starting with the Taiwan Travel Act in March of 2018 followed by the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative, the National Defense Act of 2020, the Taiwan Defense Act of 2019, the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act of 2020, among others, up to the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 there has been an unending string of pro-Taiwan legislation introduced in both houses of Congress.
At the same time, there has been a continual stream of US congressional delegations visiting Taiwan emphasizing US support.
Further whittling away strategic ambiguity has been the result of increased US arms sales to Taiwan plus training of Taiwanese troops by members of the US military. The US Coast Guard and the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration concluded a that has seen both coast guards cooperatively enforce maritime law and uphold the rule-based international order.
President Joe Biden's statements to the media that the“US has an obligation to protect Taiwan” are not an abandonment of strategic ambiguity but rather reflect the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) Section 3a that commits the US to selling defensive weapons to Taiwan.
Section 3c stipulates that“the president and Congress shall determine in accordance with the constitutional processes appropriate action by the US in response to any threat to the security or the social or economic system of Taiwan and danger to the interests of the US.”
Continued whittling away of strategic ambiguity and a transformation to strategic clarity introduces several important questions. Under US pressure, Taiwan plans to increase its defense budget for 2023 to (not factoring in special defense budgets) and ramp up the combat readiness of the reserve force. Would a declaration of strategic clarity retard such positive changes?
Should strategic clarity be interpreted as carte-blanche approval of whatever a partner country does as acceptable? Or should there be some limitations? If so, which ones? In what circumstances should such limitations be applied?
Would a declaration of strategic clarity foster Taiwanese military dependence on the US?
America rendered complete strategic clarity in Vietnam and Afghanistan. As a result, both countries became completely dependent on the US and did not seem to be able to fight without the US. This led to the US taking over every aspect of both wars and creating an American-style military and strategy for both that in many cases did not take into consideration indigenous ways of fighting and culture.
Every country has its own way of fighting wars. America financed the wars and was instrumental in their prosecution so much so that both countries became overly dependent on the US. Over-dependence can breed a lack of initiative and oddly enough, contempt.
American Taiwan policy emphasizes dual deterrence and maintenance of the status quo, which current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen supports. It is unclear who will be the next president of Taiwan. Would a declaration of strategic clarity upend the policy of dual deterrence and undermine the status quo by encouraging a successor to pursue independence? In such circumstances, would the PRC feel that to protect“rejuvenation of the motherland,” it had to invade?
To maintain working relations with Beijing, many of the United States' security partners have long relied on strategic ambiguity to being required to make firm commitments to back the US in the event of future hostilities with China over Taiwan.
In an era where the US will need to build complicated networks of alliances to counter Chinese behavior, the Biden administration runs the risk of narrowing its pool of potential partners by changing to strategic clarity. Take for example the recent negotiation on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Several of the 14 countries were concerned that if they let Taiwan join, it would hurt relations with China.
Whether or not US policy is guided by strategic ambiguity or strategic clarity, it is difficult to believe that the US would not come to Taiwan's rescue in the event of a Chinese invasion. In fact, China assumes that no matter if US Taiwan policy is wrapped in strategic ambiguity or strategic clarity, the US will come to the assistance of Taiwan.
Taiwan is the keystone in the First Island Chain. And as such the defense of Taiwan is the United States' key to maintaining its position and credibility in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world. Moreover, with Asia's growing middle classes, it is where the businesses of the future will thrive.
Rather than a change to strategic clarity, US policy should seek to build Taiwan's ability to resist, while keeping the PRC guessing.