Taking on Tehran


(MENAFN- Daily Outlook Afghanistan) US President Donald Trump's administrationhas singled out Iran – even more than Russia, China, or North Korea – withsustained pressure over the past two and a half years. The United States haswithdrawn from the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,or JCPOA), designated an arm of Iran's military (the Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps) as a foreign terrorist organization, imposed economic sanctionsagainst nearly one thousand individuals and entities, and taken steps to makeit extremely difficult for Iran to sell its oil.


US policy is working, in the sense thatmost countries (including those that disagree with Trump's policy) have judgedit better to maintain trade and investment ties with the US than with Iran.Iran's oil exports are down sharply, and its economic isolation is real andgrowing. The economy contracted some 4% in 2018 and is projected to shrink asmuch as another 6% this year. The currency is plummeting. There are reports ofprice spikes, shortages of food and medicine, and reduced financial transfersto Hezbollah and various militias central to Iran's attempts to exert influencearound the region.


But if the pressure is clear, its purposeis not. Many in the Trump administration appear to favor regime change. Butthis is unlikely to happen. Forty years after the revolution that ousted theShah, Iran's unique political-religious system and government appears strongenough to withstand US pressure and to ride out the economic difficulties.


A more likely outcome is that US economicwarfare will lead to actual warfare. Iran has made it clear that it will notjust absorb pain; it will mete it out as well. Iran was almost certainlyinvolved in recent attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and drone strikeson a Saudi airport launched by Yemen's Houthis.


Iran's government also has announced itsintention to break out gradually from the nuclear constraints imposed by theJCPOA. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is slowlyincreasing its production of nuclear fuel. The country also appears determinedto bring the level of its uranium enrichment closer to weapons grade.


All this raises the risk of a costlyconflict between Iran and one or more of its neighbors or the US. Such aconflict would almost certainly escalate and spread, leaving the US, Israel,and Iran worse off.


Somewhere between a costly war and anunlikely regime change lies a third possibility, one that would require Trumpto explore diplomacy. He changed course with North Korea; he could do the samewith Iran.


The Trump administration's criticism ofthe JCPOA was more right than wrong. While the agreement did reduce Iran'snuclear capabilities and increase the time it would need to develop nuclearweapons, the constraints it accepted were relatively short-lived, due to expireover the next decade. At that point, Iran could remain within the accord yetput into place all it would need to build a nuclear inventory with little or nowarning. This did not justify US withdrawal from the JCPOA, especially giventhat Iran was in compliance with it, but it does make a strong case forrenegotiation.


That opportunity still exists. Despite thefailure of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's recent attempt to mediatebetween the US and Iran, diplomatic prospects have arguably improved, in partbecause the sanctions are biting. The Trump administration has expressed awillingness to talk with Iran's government without preconditions. Iran has sofar rejected talks, but that might change if the US indicated that a degree ofsanctions relief would be on the table.


The time has come for such a diplomaticoverture. Think of it as JCPOA 2.0. The accord's provisions restraining Iran'snuclear activities – above all its centrifuges and nuclear fuel – would beextended well into the future. A revised agreement would also restrain Iran'sballistic missile program. In return, Iran would receive relief from many ofthe sanctions that have been introduced. The US could also formalize Trump'sstatement that he seeks policy change, not regime change. There is a goodchance the European participants in the original negotiations – Britain,France, Germany, and the European Union – would sign on to such an approach.Submitting a revised accord to the US Congress for its formal approval wouldsignal that the US would not walk away a second time.


Some sanctions would and should stay inplace, however, given Iranian activities in the region. In principle, one couldimagine a negotiation that would offer to remove all sanctions in exchange fora cessation of Iran's efforts in Syria and Yemen, an end to its support ofterrorism, and the introduction of liberal political reforms at home. But thiswould have no chance of succeeding. All or nothing diplomacy will producenothing. As was the case with arms control between the US and the Soviet Union duringthe Cold War, it is sometimes sufficiently ambitious to seek to limitcompetition, rather than eliminate it.


This is not to suggest Iran would enjoy afree hand in the region. Israel will presumably continue to pursue targetedmilitary action to ensure that Iran cannot establish a military presence andinfrastructure in Syria near Israel's border, as it has done in Lebanon. Andthe US should maintain an augmented military presence in or near the PersianGulf, keep troops in Syria, and maintain a meaningful diplomatic and militarypresence in Iraq.


Promoting JCPOA 2.0 would not lead tonormalization of diplomatic ties with Iran, but it would dramatically reducethe chance of war or Iran's emergence as a nuclear-armed power, a developmentthat would likely prompt Saudi Arabia and several other countries to followsuit. The Middle East is dangerous enough already without adding yet another,far deadlier dimension to the mix.-

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